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The Body has a Mind of its Own

Exploring the Mind versus Body Dialectic in Three 18th Century Novels

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Abstrak:

Hierdie dissertasie ondersoek die Verligtingstydperk se dialektiek van die intellek teenoor die liggaamlike. My tesis vestig die aandag op die spanninge binne die Verligtingsideologie en die wyse waarop 'n historiese tyd wat op 'n verskeidenheid maniere in stryd met homself was, die verskyning van 'n materialistiese filosofie tot gevolg gehad het. Dit betrek die fiksie van die agtiende-eeuse skrywers naamlik Jean-Jacques Casanova, Denis Diderot en Tobias E. Smollett. Hierdie skrywers wys hoe menslike lyflikheid gemanifesteer word in 'n kulturele konteks wat groter waarde heg aan die intellek as aan die sinnelike. My bespreking beoog om aan te toon hoedat liggaam en gees volgens hierdie skrywers gelyksoortige intellektuele kapasiteit besit. Menslike lyflike intelligensie is in staat om uitdrukking te gee aan hierdie ingebore kennis en ervaring. Op die manier, verteenwoordig hierdie skrywers 'n aspek van die Verligting wat die onderskeiding tussen rasonele denke en onderliggende liggaamsdrange ondergawe.

Abstract:

This dissertation explores the mind versus body dialectic of the Enlightenment period. My thesis draws attention to the tensions within Enlightenment ideology and the manner in which materialist philosophy surfaces as a consequence of an historical period at odds with itself in a variety of ways. It engages the fictional work of three eighteenth century writers: Jean-Jacques Casanova, Denis Diderot and Tobias E. Smollett. These writers show how the presence of the body is made manifest in a cultural context which favoured the intellect over the sensual drives. My discussion ventures to show that for these writers, the mind and body possess similar intellectual capacity. The body possesses an intelligence of its own and is capable of expressing that intelligence in a way that accentuates its innate knowledge and experience. In this way, these writers represent an Enlightenment trend that undercuts the distinction between the rational will and a subjacent, unruly body.

INTRODUCTION

The eighteenth century novels : *The Indiscreet Jewels/Les Bijoux Indiscrets*, Denis Diderot, 1748; *The Complete Memoirs of Jacques Casanova de Seignalt* 1725-1798, Jacques Casanova de Seignalt, 1894; *The Adventures of Ferdinand Count Fathom*, Tobias E. Smollett, 1753, engage in some of the important conflicting ideologies prevalent in eighteenth century Europe. In the context of the 18th century's concern with rationality and scientific enquiry, I will explore the ways in which these literary works undercut some of these Enlightenment precepts. In the process, I will argue that the Enlightenment did not consist solely of one overarching theme - the principle of rationality. Instead, the period was comprised of multiple ideologies and intellectual positions, running alongside each other. In particular, my project aims to point out, using the above works of fiction, how these ideologies generate productive conflicts. Although it may be logical to assume that since the Enlightenment centres itself upon rationalism, it disregarded the domain of the sensuous body. Yet, we find that the focus on empirical knowledge also generated a fascination with the sensuous body.

The primary focus of my discussion, then, is to detect the ways in which fiction allows us to locate the dynamic exchange of concepts as they supersede one another to gain a position at the dominant vanguard of Enlightenment thought. I propose that these seemingly conflicting ideas be placed alongside each other so as to see how they coincide. Materialist eighteenth century fiction affords us the opportunity to consider the mechanics of how the sensuous body was understood and refigured in the age of rationalist empiricism.

Through engaging closely with the abovementioned works, we discover that eighteenth century fiction suggests a complex fluidity of ideas that subtended the Enlightenment. The fictional nature of the novel, stages the possibility of the body interrupting and contesting the positivist logic of the Age of Reason. Questions of self-governance and the nature of the senses will then be explored to reflect on the tensions generated by the separation of the body and mind. David Hartley, writing in the 18th century, gained contention for his writings on human nature. His

best known work: *Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty and His Expectations* first published in 1749, drew a multitude of admirers from Britain and America, and parts of Europe. The work is appreciated for its wide scope of subjects ranging from psychology to spirituality. He elaborates on how our actions are formed and how the self transfigures with psychological growth reaching divinity eventually. Hartley asserts that:

By the mechanism of human actions I mean, that each action results from previous circumstances of body and mind, as other affects do from their mechanical causes [...] If by free-will be meant power of beginning motion, this will come to the same thing; since, according to the opinion of mechanism, as here explained, man has no such power; but every action, or bodily motion arises from [...] bodily motions already existing in the brain (*Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty and His Expectations* 314)

The body as a material *thing* is driven in deterministic ways by impulses and desires that counter the rule of the mind. The authors, with whom I engage, show that these impulses and desires are important to the way rationality functions; that reason and the material body are not engaged in the conflict that sets reason up as the higher power, but that reason is deeply rooted in, as well as disrupted by the material life of the body.

Diderot's *The Indiscreet Jewel/Les Bijoux Indiscrets*, does this in a way that is both striking and mesmerizing. When Cucufa's (the genie) ring is turned upon the women of the Congo, their genitalia starts speaking their secret sexual encounters. The stories are blurted out from beneath their dresses or garments, and heard by those in their immediate surroundings. What Diderot does here, is to posit a body that possesses a voice. The issue then is not so much that we have no knowledge that a materialist notion of the body is prevalent in Enlightenment theory, but rather that we commonly deemphasize its role. My aim then is to remind us of what the body is saying - in quite a literal way, through the use of Diderot's *The Indiscreet Jewels*.

If we look at Smollett's *Ferdinand Count Fathom*, we see that the mind and body are at odds with each other. Ferdinand often exerts manic outbursts of carnal desire, physical fevers which burn within his blood, and his moral sensibility becomes compromised. Free will and self-governance, both features reflecting the cognitive faculties become the testament confirming the presence of a material body unable to be contained by the rationality of the mind. What Smollett's novel suggests is that there seems to be a polarised tension between the mental and corporeal faculties. Amidst Ferdinand's scandalous exploits, his moral sensibility arrests him abruptly. It acts as his nemesis and he contends with it in a way that juxtaposes the divide between moral relativism and licentiousness. David Hartley clarifies that:

[I]t is evident that [...] the actions of mankind proceed, in many cases, from motives, i.e. from the influence which the pleasures and pains of sensation, imagination, ambition and self-interest [...] and the moral sense have over them. And these motives seem to act like all other causes. When motive is strong, the action is performed with vigour; when weak, feebly. When a contrary motive intervenes, it checks or overrules, in proportion to its relative strength [...] (314)

This is ultimately at the crux of Smollett's novel. Moral sense takes precedence over bodily agency, insofar as the body succumbs to its rule. In many instances Ferdinand's sensual urgency holds him captive and manifests uncontrollably in instances where the cause of it is sometimes unexplainable. Casanova, on the other hand, appears not as vulgar as Diderot, or as ashamed as Smollett, but rather unapologetically human. With Casanova, my aim is not to adjudicate the truthfulness of these apparently autobiographical accounts. Whether Casanova wrote under a pseudonym, whether his memoirs are based on truth is not the interest of my project. I am therefore asserting early on that my treatment of the slices of his memoirs which I have selected is purely of literary concern and interest. My interest is in the representations of that cultured body found knitted in these lyrical and witty, beautifully composed lines by Casanova. Even though he asks, in the preface to his *Memoirs*, that he be afforded the indulgence of recounting his pleasures in the narratives to follow; he does not seem to follow a

consecutive series of events as in the other narratives. He writes for the sole purpose of storytelling. We must take into account that his work is autobiographical: in this sense, he fictionalizes his own body. So it operates in a complex space between the factual nature of the autobiography and the liberties of fiction.

What is striking in his collection of stories is that he actually composes a series of inadvertent philosophies which, if gathered together, could be read as a work which contributes to the materialist philosophy of the eighteenth century. My primary aim is to draw on those instances in which he theorizes certain habits of the body functioning within its social and domestic context, to highlight the tensions that traverse the culture of the time.

The sensuous body assumes its position as a notable site for acknowledgement and recognition in each of these three novels. In different ways, we can say that the body develops (as) a *character* in these narratives. It develops on the intersection between the fundamental driving force sex and the demands of logic. I am interested not in exploring the disjuncture between body and mind, but in considering instances where they are not clearly separable. Through the genre of the novel, I would like to propose that we no longer need to see these realms as conflicting, or opposing; but as elements of the same device - even in the Age of Reason.

I would also like to clarify that there is a logic that drives sex and the sexual body: it is not merely a blind drive repressed by rationalism, but a different order of logic. To be human, at least in these novels, is to be animated by different forms of logic, including the logic of the body. In Freudian theory, we learn that the unconscious has an identifiable logic, one that can be studied. Freud's insistence on the power and logic of the unconscious mind is already prefigured in Enlightenment literary works, despite the fact that Freud is read as breaking decisively with the Enlightenment valorization of reason.

My aim is to trace the fault lines within Enlightenment thought through a close inspection of the respective texts and in so doing to examine the presence of the body in narrative form, but also to examine the narrative of the body itself: the ways in which it contradicts the opinions and *stories* prevalent in Enlightenment thought.

The language of the body is that unspoken discourse within the body which carries the materialist expression which is often deemphasized or unacknowledged. In the novels, this language is vocalized and framed through drawing our attention to explicit sexual or physical activity performed by the body. This language bears its own form of truth and counters the notion of rationality, which is centrifugal to the relationship between the mind and so-called soul. It will steer my argument in the direction of Diderot's materialist philosophy, which pronounces that the body in fact possesses more reliable or justifiable knowledge than the mind. I predict the following postulations surfacing in my study: that the body has a mind of its own and reason is the product of the body's experiences.

...

LITERATURE REVIEW

The age of Enlightenment came about by a plurality of ideologies which manifested between the late 17th and early 18th century. Europe became the leading region perpetuating this new wave of thinking. Enlightenment thinking served to deconstruct ideas of faith, tradition and superstition by using scientific research and reason. More accurately, it served to supplant these ideas which leaned on divine intervention or inspiration for governance and guidance.

The 21st century author, John Leigh, writes in his introductory book: *The Search for Enlightenment* that eighteenth century thinking developed on the premise of the chief ideologies of the seventeenth century (16). He describes this transmission in somewhat biological terms: “But if the eighteenth century is a nursery of ideas; the seventeenth century was their birthplace” (15). Thus eighteenth century enlightenment should be considered as a retrospective concept built on the influence of the seventeenth century; a concept not necessarily reactive *against* its prior age’s ideology, but one that has developed *from* it. When thinking of how a certain era’s ideology functions within its context, it is interesting to note that it occurs not at odds with its precursor; but actually at odds with itself. Leigh marks:

Never, in recent times, had a century been so dazzled by the previous one and so conscious of its own pallor. Even the most independent minds of the eighteenth century were impressed with the brilliance and originality of the thinkers and writers of the previous century. But this reverence, always, if tacitly, acts as a commentary on their own age, a self-assessment exercise (15)

Because of this self-assessing feature of the eighteenth century it is nearly impossible to section off a central philosophy. Knud Haakonssen, the intellectual historian, has written extensively on the politics and culture of the eighteenth century. As a modern historian, he notes that over the last two centuries, eighteenth century scholars have paid close attention to synthesizing a stable philosophy to attribute to this century, calling it the Enlightenment. However, he understands that a two-pronged approach serves as a more accurate description of

what eighteenth century philosophy encompassed: we should think of the philosophy involved as part of a broader cultural movement namely “the Enlightenment”; also, the eighteenth century marks a context in which the philosophies of thinkers like Francis Bacon, René Descartes, Immanuel Kant and Thomas Reid could contribute their ideas as modern philosophers (*The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Philosophy* 3). Daniel Brewer, in *The Discourse of Enlightenment in Eighteenth-Century France*, speaks of the Enlightenment period as an assemblage of enlightenments. He writes about Diderot as amplifying the Enlightenment’s struggle to generate a purely rationalist commentary. This reinforces the idea that enlightenment ideology functions as being at odds with itself and also echoes Brewer’s conclusion that, it “can only seek to be more powerful than what it sets itself against” (3). We find that the enlighteners engaged with new knowledge so as to rationalized prior forms thereof. As Leigh explains, the contrast between the pallor of the Enlightenment and the brilliance of its precedent resulted in a multiplicity of ideas. This multiplicity became the conglomerate of ideas which presents itself as Enlightenment ideology. Brewer asserts that “in the empowerment of reason one witnesses a transformation of Enlightenment into myth, the conversion of a philosophy into an ideology of rationalization [...]” (5). From a series of inquiries made by the canonical philosophers of the time, Enlightenment theory became the new praxis. It became a way of dealing with knowledge and a means of substantiating knowledge with scientific evidence.

The Enlightenment saw the progression from a culture involving the Church as the government and God as the seat of wisdom, to a culture where intellectuals started questioning the validity of religious mysticism:

The idea of Enlightenment as a style of thinking and as a cultural process were typical of, but not exclusive to the eighteenth century was common in the European debate at the turn of that century [...] Apart from the danger of tautology- namely that the philosophy of the eighteenth century is the philosophy of enlightenment because the Enlightenment is the eighteenth century- the concept is either too wide or too narrow to capture the

philosophical riches of the century (*The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-century Philosophy* 1-2: 3-4)

The French Revolution of the eighteenth century played an extremely important role in influencing enlightenment philosophy. Notably, there was a rejection of the French *philosophes* by the said revolutionaries of the era. This rejection sparked a series of lectures which then formed part of the new philosophy developed in Britain, France, Germany and the like. Thinkers like Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1818), Victor Cousin (1815), and Hegel (in the 1820s), contributed to this counter-revolution philosophy (Haakonssen 5):

In this regard, the most common charges are rationalism (meaning intellectualism) at the expense of passion and imagination; the idea of a universal human nature, to the detriment of individuality; individualism disregarding social and spiritual holism; scientific generalizing, in ignorance of historical understanding of the particular; and universalism and internationalism without respect for the local or national. Without entering into complications about the *differences* between the various deriders of the Enlightenment, it should be obvious that it is pointless to shackle the philosophy of the century to a concept that to such a degree has been shaped and reshaped by the culture wars of later periods (Haakonssen 6, emphasis in original)

The ‘differences’ of which he speaks echoes his sentiment about not speaking about the Enlightenment in the ‘singular sense’ but that it should be regarded on a trajectory of ‘several other Enlightenments’ (4). Brewer highlights another issue concerning the Enlightenment and describes it as “the other story of Enlightenment” which makes it “increasingly difficult to believe in a mythical Enlightenment” (5).

The French Revolution reacted against religious orthodoxy and the absolutist nature of the monarchy. It questioned these particular types of authority in a way that spawned a backlash involving religious tolerance, individual liberty, scientific progress and the separation of the church and state. It questioned authorities such

as the church and the monarch, to give vent to libertine ideas resulting in this backlash impacting the imagination and passionate faculties. Haakonsen asserts that the imagination and passionate faculties were overthrown by the idea that the intellect provided a seat of superior knowledge which served to eradicate the authority of Catholic dogma. Denis Diderot as a writer of fiction, finds a way to expose the dynamic between the mind and body.

Denis Diderot - both a materialist philosopher and an eighteenth century writer - exposes a kind of mystical enlightenment philosophy in his fiction. Diderot brought to light the divergent philosophy of materialism. Although the traits of the philosophy of enlightenment were reason and logic, materialism emerged as a way of emphasizing that although man may function in his intellectual capacity, his corporeal nature should not be entirely disregarded. Materialism did not necessarily arise as a counter-theory but as a side effect of Enlightenment philosophy straining against itself. In Diderot's *The Indiscreet Jewels* (1748), he toys with the body as a site for mystical symbolism. He offers a satirical approach to viewing both the body and the soul through the voice of the women's genitalia in a mythical Congo. Diderot's *The Indiscreet Jewels*, dislocates the self and posits it as a body part: *le bijou* (the jewel/the vagina), which speaks on behalf of the women carriers so to speak (carriers in that they possess the jewels). In this way the self is dislocated and relocated to a very inconspicuous location; one which is impossible to ignore and which is at the core of corporeal pleasure. By flagging female genitalia, Diderot - recognizably a materialist philosopher - forces into view the inconsistency or instability rather of the philosophy of the Age of Reason which served liberate man from the curse of ignorance. He welcomes the idea that the body is more knowledgeable than the mind. That the genie Cucufa's ring has the ability to unlock the voice of the female genitalia, suggests that there is an undeniable extension of voices. It is important to note that the women of the Congo are given the power to convey their own stories. However, Diderot seems to take interest in the fact that the patriarchal figure possesses this power initially, by Mangogul having control of the ring. He then transfers his power towards the women and only then are they allowed to speak. It is also notable that the jewels' chatter happens involuntarily and can thus be read as the female body speaks only

of its desires and escapades when given the power to do so. However, the female genital voice, extends beyond its own measures and captures the attention of spiritual superiors, the majority of which are men. It interacts not only as a voice on behalf of the women, but as a voice of Brahman (god) - this magnifies a universal consciousness.

By that we see that the voice of the body now not only operates from one corporeal point, but it is sanctioned as a supernal oracle by the Mystics in the novel. The labial voice becomes the soul: the soul of the woman to whom it belongs. The voice carries the soul and it is this distinctive feature that tampers with our understanding that the soul is not the self, or is superior to the body. In this sense Diderot seems to be reconciling the body with the soul, as a unified entity. In this way, he indicates that the body has intelligence, and that this intelligence is not inferior to the intelligence of the mind. Through its sensuality and 'voice', the body encapsulates a knowledge which is most prominently exercised through desire.

Mirán Božovič, writes concerning Diderot's novel. He engages the idea that the body is unified to its soul. He draws his understanding from Mirzoza who claims that whichever part of the body leads, it is in this region where the soul is found. Hence the soul travels throughout the body during the course of each person's lifespan. In this way, the body has a fundamental understanding of the desires of the soul which makes it a somewhat psychological entity. It is because of this inherent knowledge of the soul's direction (desires), that the body is fixed to its own soul. Božovič, who posits the body as an omniscient 'hub of all-encompassing knowledge', mentions that "a body *is* its own soul" ("The Omniscient Body" 17, my emphasis). He says about Diderot's *The Indiscreet Jewels*: "[T]he voice coming from the head, traditionally held to be the seat of the soul is, in cross-examination, contradicted by a voice which comes from that part of the body which is least submissive to the head or mind [and thus] depicts the confrontation between the spiritualist and the materialist systems of the human soul" (20). His argument focuses on the surfacing of man's internal, sexual drives that are pushed aside by the power of reason in an attempt to control them; and foregrounds the

'materialist system of the soul'. This materialist view in fact intersects with 20th century psychoanalytic thought, which continued to trouble the mind-body distinction. It also sheds light on other neo-Enlightenment preoccupations which all in effect constitute philosophies which find their most violent and intense birth pangs in the wave of Enlightenment thinking. *The Indiscreet Jewels* directs our attention to the voice of *le bijou* or the jewel: what is it saying? At which time does it speak? What are the tones in this vaginal voice? Božovič's understanding is that the invisible bearer of this voice "is automatically assigned exceptional powers" (21).

The exceptional power of desire to possess the body speaks to how the self disintegrates. Another point that Božovič also touches on is that, the self dislocates upon the commands of the body. The soul which is the self, roams within the body, depending on which parts are being aroused. In this way, it renders the control of the mind, ineffective. Therefore, the body becomes its own soul: the speaking body which is ultimately a notion drawn from materialist philosophy itself.

For Smollett, *Ferdinand Count Fathom* is a man deserving of our sympathy, a man who is inhibited by his sensual appetite. Smollett wants us to look upon Fathom and pity him, and more importantly, determine the 'lesson' from Fathom's adventures. These adventures show his demise as a result of him being possessed by his own desire. He is a base character to whom we as base humans should pledge allegiance. But why then does Smollett seem somewhat ashamed of his character? Displaying the decadence of desire but also adopting a redemptive stance in Fathom's story. Smollett wants to expose a disorder and its cure through his characterization of Fathom. What is the purpose of such a self-reflexive novel? Jerome Gaub, Smollett's contemporary, who also wrote on the mind body politic, writes:

I do not wish to detract completely from the usefulness and efficacy of reasoning, advising, admonishing and rebuking, of strict and earnest discipline... They often help in preventing vices from forcibly breaking out. When the latter are fixed in the structure of the body, however, it is

difficult to pluck them out in such a way that they do not return again and again. The root deeply seated in the body must be torn out ("De Regimine Mentis", *Rather Mind and Body in Eighteenth Century Medicine: A Study on Jerome Gaub's "De Regimine Mentis"* 65).

Smollett's fictionalization of Ferdinand's redemption from a life driven by bodily vice confirms that Gaub's concern is valid. To uproot the origin of these vices, one must uproot desire altogether. Smollett apparently sets out to disclose a moral behind the story, a moral behind the body.

In his essay, "Conversion, Seduction, and Medicine in Smollett's *Ferdinand Count Fathom*", John McAllister teases out the tensions of the "deeply rooted vices" within the body so as to refashion the notion that the body only does what the mind tells it to do. McAllister conducts an open-ended argument. By exploring the body's mechanical motion, which is posited very strongly in *Fathom*, the text presents itself as a lecture on sensuality versus sensibility; thus unraveling the issue of moral sensibility reforming corporeal impiety. In contrast to Smollett's meticulously forged moral message we find Casanova. His *Memoirs* are a personal account of his own life; the authenticity of the autobiographical nature of these accounts provides an unprocessed treatment of his own personal adventures. It is therefore because of this overt "personal-ity" innate in this autobiographical work, that Casanova's adventures are described with such vivacity. His memoirs read like adventures, almost synonymous with the fiction of Smollett, yet with Casanova, the writing gives us a glimpse into what happens when no so-called cure can remedy bodily vices.

What his collection does is that it expresses the hedonistic impulses of a *too-hungry* appetite for corporeal pleasure. Arthur Symons, a devout Casanovian, forms part of the conversation alongside other Casanovian scholars like Arthur Machen. The credit awarded to Symons is based on his empirical findings of unpublished writings of Casanova at Dux and he claims to "take Casanova seriously, to show him in his relation to his time, and in relation to his human problems" (1). Symons' *Casanova at Dux: An Unpublished Chapter of History* acts as a precursor to

his *Memoirs*, which serves to enrich and enlighten further engagement with Casanova's writings, namely his *Memoirs*.

Casanova casts an all-illuminating light on his own life and takes us through various excursions which unbelievably only constitute one-third of his love affairs. Symons tells us that he ventures often on "fanciful excursions into science [...] as in the note on Algebra, which traces its progress since the year 1494" (337). Although digressive in his narrative, he seems to show a kind of coherence characteristic of his *Memoirs*, and which formulates a Casanovian logic which can only be understood in engaging with the collection in its totality.

Casanova, the master raconteur and adventurer writes his memoirs in the wake of a decadent 18th century. A time bred in revolution, on the cusp of acquiring a philosophy built primarily on rationality. In 18th century Europe, a place basked in conflicting ideologies, stands a man who delights in women finding pleasure, the 'genius lover' as some would have him. What is ultimately intriguing about the Casanovian memoirs is that, it is written from the perspective of Casanova himself, using his own life as the subject matter. He is storyteller and character, subject and object, self and other. Simplistically, one could describe these memoirs as autobiographical which they are; but because of their fastidiousness and rapacity, they read like fictitious adventures and scholars have often questioned their veracity. They have been thought of as "so entertaining, so utterly frank, and apparently so incredible in the richness and variety of their adventures that for almost two score of years serious and intelligent authorities doubted their authenticity" (Monet "Introduction", *Casanova's Memoirs* 7).

Together with Diderot, Smollett and Casanova, this project will be steered in the direction of intimate engagement with the most conflicting philosophies of the eighteenth century: materialism and how it manifests through fiction and its representation of the body as a site for knowledge. Therefore placing all three of these writers in conversation with one another will stimulate a rigorous debate within in the confines of the multiple discourses so characteristic of the Enlightenment period. All three Enlightenment thinkers in their fictionalization of

the eighteenth century, foregrounds albeit unconsciously and under the guise of characterization (even Casanova in the sense that he allows himself full written rein over his stories); corporeal power that wrestles with that of reason. The texts provide empirical evidence that Enlightenment thought in its totality was a paradigm in which divergent philosophies fought for space. Through these novels and memoirs the grip of reason could be slackened and in this way the truths and anxieties of the Age of Reason could be underscored, elevated and illuminated.

By paying attention to the relationship between the reader and fiction, it will become apparent as to just how it creates the domain of play where divergent ideas have the scope to coincide with one another with more liberty. Literature affords the reader the opportunity to imagine and in this way, it allows the reader to have their imagination interact with their existing ideas on the subject matter contained within the work of fiction. The fluidity of the novel genre and expanse of playing field it provides remove the pressure of assuming a determinate political or social stance, and allows the reader to do just that, play. Fiction provides the reader with the ability to imagine a subjunctive event, to consider the idea: what if something else happens or, what about something else happening? That ‘something else’ is the other Enlightenment Haakonssen alludes to: the other side of Enlightenment in this case. Natania Meeker asserts that: “the reader’s desire for sympathetic attachment to literary character as a “natural” expression of subjectivity would have suggested, on its own, a dedication to the cultivation of a very particular perceptual [response...]” (207). Smollett aims for this sympathetic attachment to literary character of which Meeker speaks, and for this to be achieved the reader should be able to resonate with Fathom for any moral guidance to be drawn from his story.

Diderot conceives his story at the apex of political commentary and social satire, rendering an opinion piece on the state of affairs in French bourgeois society:

Society can only benefit tremendously from this duplication of faculties. Possibly we men, in turn shall one day speak from somewhere other than the mouth. Who can tell? That which accords itself so perfectly well with

jewels might be destined to question and answer them (*Indiscreet Jewels* 24)

Referencing patriarchal aristocracy, Diderot hints at the “testosteroned” counter voice of the vagina. He suggests that there should follow a conversation between the two sexes, the two bodies, but to which ends, and for what purpose? Is it a social experiment and if so, what would be the outcome of such an experiment? In the case of Casanova, his fiction-like memoirs have a way of disrupting the capacity of its reader. How does his personalized ‘fictions’ help us decipher the volatility of his time and to which extent are we allowed to ‘play’ in his domain through the characterization of himself?

What should be looked at is then, how these written pieces involve disjunctions of the enlightenment and to which degree they operate. Meeker pertinently explains that:

The Sadean obsession with the novel as a site for the production of social relationships, for better or for worse, would thus already have been, [...], a familiar one to readers of the period. Yet the potentially generative function of the novel as a political instrument does not typically make itself visible, either in Sade’s literary theory or in his libertines’ formulations of their own practice, in the form of an “‘acting out” on the part of any given reader. In fact, this kind of reaction is for Sade a manifestation of a problematically mystificatory faith in the ability of discursive systems to compel those who “believe” in their power to engender resemblances among persons (207, emphasis in original)

When interacting with the issue of belief, it is understood that literature fits into the discourse of its context in a very specific way, how does it do this? What is the plausibility of its commentary on its context and how in which sense does it resonate with its reader? For all three authors, the connection between literature and philosophy opens itself up for the reader to contribute their own insights to its content. It is in this exact liminal space between fiction and theory, that we as readers should assume right place to develop postulations, and to contend with ideas not commonly entertained in the realm of theory.

That liminality allows us to write back but moreover think back to the glitches of the Enlightenment, to the other story of Enlightenment. It allows one - as Diderot's *Mangogul* invites - to respond to the voice emanating from fiction, by doing exactly what fiction itself does, play. Literary theory then assists in drawing informed analyses within the domain of playful fiction.

...

Chapter 1

The Indiscreet Jewels - Denis Diderot

1.1 CONVERSATIONS WITH VOCAL VAGINAS

*Our bodies moved and hardened
Hurting parts of your garden
With no room for a pardon
In a place where no one knows what we have done*
(Damien Rice *Accidental Babies*, 2006)

In Diderot's controversial tale, *The Indiscreet Jewels*, the lead characters referenced in the title, although unseen do not go unheard. They whisper, shrill and shout, and command attention. They are the "new tellers of tales" which the reader has to become familiar with. The faceless gems spill out scandalous stories about their mistresses. They are indiscreet, unrehearsed and volatile and all they need is one ring to set them off like sirens. Mangogul, prince of Congo, to dispose of his boredom, accepts the genie Cucufa's gift: the magic ring. It allows him to penetrate the garment of any woman he desires and dislodge the voice of their vagina, modestly called the jewel. It is important to understand that the jewels are not governed by the women who possess them, but they speak of their own accord. They have the capacity to cultivate their own dialect, one which is only understood through the body and one which is induced by the vaginal urge to do what it pleases.

In order to recognize the voice of the jewel, Mangogul understands that he has to trace its origin. By engaging with Cucufa, the genie, he uncovered where these voices came from:

"From the most honest part of them and the best instructed on the things you desire to know" said Cucufa. "From their jewels." "From their jewels!" repeated the sultan, bursting into laughter. "This is something new. Talking jewels! How preposterous!" (*The Indiscreet Jewels* 13)

The unconventional speaking organ, from which Mangogul retrieves his knowledge

about the women's sexual infidelities, is at once the locus of interest for the Sultan.

I wish to unpack the process by which Mangogul acquires his knowledge of the decadent scandals which come in deluge from the women's vaginal openings. In order for me to do so, I need to develop my hypothesis concerning his treatment of their vaginas. Firstly I am by no means trying to steer away from Mangogul's ringing as a form of rape. The stimulation of the tongue of the vagina - which could be considered as the clitoris - with the Sultan's ring brings about a throbbing sensation which induces an orgasmic reaction and hence the vagina releases the word (about the scandals of the women) and spreads it. Mangogul, together with the magic of Cucufa's ring, has the power to:

[T]ransport himself to a hundred places where he was not expected and see with his own eyes many things that usually occur without witnesses, he had only to put on the ring and say, "I will be *there*," and instantly he was there. (*Indiscreet Jewels* 14, my emphasis)

He can position himself at the very entrance of the vagina - and although he is not directly engaging in dialogue with its voice, the stories emanating from within, are rather revealing. Thus for Mangogul "being there" illustrates not only a transportation to his desired jewel; but he is also *there*: at the place and atmosphere in which the spoken adventure takes place, transported through his imagination to the location in question. In the same sense, he also finds himself *there*: fitted at the opening of the vaginal mouth anticipating its voluptuous monologue. So there is this interplay among the regional aspects of where the Sultan finds himself; all of which depend on how the voice of the jewel interprets its unique story.

What is seen is not the inferiorization of the female voice that can only be heard through a redistribution of the voice to her sexual organs. However, Diderot serves to emancipate the voice by encouraging the possibilities for reading the narrative in a new way. He does not consider himself as a literary rapist (penetrating the veiled parts of the women) but rather a liberator (giving rise to the voice of the

subdued organ, the conquered mouth).

Given the historical climate of the novel, Jack Barbalet describes how “the seventeenth century writers were concerned with the passions as a *source* of self-knowledge, self-control, and power over others, themes current still but predicated on assumptions no longer familiar” (174-75, my emphasis). Similarly, Michel Foucault describes a similar idea to flag the resolution of power in relation to sex, he says:

For many years, we have all been living under [...] an immense curiosity about sex, bent on questioning it, with an insatiable desire to hear it speak and be spoken about [...] [a]s if it were essential for us to be able to draw from that little piece of ourselves not only pleasure but knowledge, and a whole subtle interchange from one to the other: a knowledge of pleasure, a pleasure that comes of knowing pleasure, a knowledge-pleasure. (*History of Sexuality* 1: 5)

It is exactly this *knowledge-pleasure* to which Mangogul resigns himself. His curiosity takes urgency by his desire to understand the pleasures of the jewels. The jewels possess the knowledge of their own pleasure and incite the curiosity of others to desire that same knowledge. The novel is imbued with discussions of the jewel chatter by theorists such as Orcotomus, the religious sect of the Brahmins and the suspicious husbands of the women in question. Once the Congo is excited by the first chattering jewel, Alcina’s jewel, the sporadic induction of curiosity about so many other jewels, inevitably follows. Foucault describes how the knowledge not only of pleasure but of power inflates our curiosity to retrieve our *knowledge-pleasure*:

It is our problem to know what marvellous ring confers a similar power on us, on which master’s finger it has been placed; what game of power it makes possible or presupposes, and how it is that each one of us has become a sort of attentive and imprudent sultan with respect to his own sex and that of others (7).

Firstly, the issues of power, portrayed by the presence of sex in society, give us reason to believe that sex is some cult practice which rebels against the order of an organized society. As social citizens, we are designed to be structured by our current culture's ideology which either induces our reception or rejection of the sensual body. For Diderot, the preoccupation with this kind of body, was formulated by the previous century's inability to maintain its grasp on its own understanding thereof.

The seventeenth century's preoccupation with metaphysics and religion had partly been "displaced by a more naturalistic and secular faith, misleading described as Enlightenment, by the eighteenth-century" (Jack Barbalet 175). The question of coming to terms with the presence of the sensuous body is dependent upon "thy passions" and if you "consider with what company thou most delightest, [...] in them thou shalt see a patterne of thy passions: for like affecteth like" (Barbalet 176). This pattern created through the 'misleading', as Barbalet puts it, called the Enlightenment serves to question the presuppositions of passion and the more decadent desires. These desires have the ability to redouble and speak for themselves, telling their own tale. In fact, one of the features contributing to the occurrence of a tell-tale sex is that of repression. Repression occurs at the other end of a counter force. It is therefore impossible to think of repression as existing in and of itself.

In Diderot's novel, there are tell-tale signs of a sex which operates at its own will. It is that sex which reveals mysteries about itself and others; the sex that uncovers hidden idiosyncrasies and licentiousness. This is the understanding behind Foucault's comment on licit and illicit sex. What kinds of sex are permitted and in which context? The tell-tale sex however, always finds itself compromised, not knowing in which category it should reside. For the Brahmins in Diderot's tale, the voice of the jewel exposes the voice of the women's moral conscience; they command the women to "submit to the will of Brahma. Allow the voice of [the] jewel to awaken the voice of [their] conscience. Do not blush at confessing crimes [they] had no shame to commit." (61) The spiritual leaders grapple with the explicit nature of the chattering jewel. Therefore, they rationalize it by ascribing spiritual significance to the entire incident; they assign divine punishment as the

esoteric force behind the chattering jewels to the strange occurrence. They try to retain authority over the women by doing this, not acknowledging that the voice coming from the jewel is also exerting power over them; by tampering with their understanding of how a body ought to conduct itself or how it ought to be commissioned by the intellect to conduct itself. However, the women are incriminated by the voice of the jewel, mainly because of the shame associated with illicit sex. In this instance, there is an increasing need for repression. In the pursuit to shut the mouth of the jewel, repression is not only amplified but we also see that it is an expression of shame toward the subject of sex altogether.

Given the conspicuous nature of sex in this particular context, shamefulness takes immediate effect when the measure to which sex is exposed increases. This measure of exposure is often dependent upon the power at work within the context of the thriving sex. In which case it speaks with that all-knowing voice which eliminates the tendency of reason to object to the truths it exposes: [W]hat interest could these [the jewels] have in disguising the truth? Their motive could only be an illusion of honour. But a jewel has no illusions, it is surely not the seat of prejudice (*Indiscreet Jewels* 24).

Sex has no scruples in the face of propriety or power. Since the voice of the jewels have the tendency to speak in public, unhinged and unrehearsed, we can be sure that their speech is loaded with direct expositions about their mistresses, and there is no opportunity for a counter-voice or power to nullify their expressions. Foucault understands that:

In a specific type of discourse on sex. In a specific form of extortion of truth appearing historically and in specific places, [...] what were the most immediate, the most local powers at work? How were these discourses used to support the power relations at work? (*History of Sexuality* 1: 25)

Diderot imagines a kingdom of Congo, a Sultan and his mistress who strangely bear similar characteristics of France, Louis XV and Mme Pompadour. To read this novel in its political environment would help us clarify the issues of power it displays. The power relations present within Diderot's almost direct allusions, are not merely symbols of state power-relations and how they impact the society but also

the significance of an uncontrollable tongue of an absurd speech organ. Diderot suffocates the women's natural speaking voice to grant their jewels the opportunity to speak, yet only in the moment where Mangogul rings the vagina. Why is this? Diderot's narrative directly deals with the genital voice striking out against the authority of the Brahmins and the Sultan. Even though the Sultan uses the ring to provoke the women's vaginas to speak, he is at the mercy of their voice. He feels threatened by the possibility that his Mirzoza may be withholding secrets only the jewel could expose, secrets which could possibly contradict his conviction of her fidelity. When considering the content contained within the stories of the women's natural speaking voice and that of her jewel, Mangogul is left to wonder: "When a woman's mouth and jewel contradict each other, which should be believed?" (24).

It is simply because the jewels speak more erratically and emphatically that they draw attention to the contents of their speech. It is as if the controversial content contained in the jewels' stories involuntarily emphasizes their plausibility. Because the women's speech from their facial lips is conditioned to veil the secrecy of their actions, the lips from their lower region pour out uncompromisingly explicit information concerning the kind of experiences they have endured. The voice of the jewel, because it is only heard for the first time, does not engage in debate with the voice of their mistresses; which is why they, when pressed by the ring, simply divulge their silenced secrets as if that given moment is their only chance to do so. They speak with a feverish passion. As Barbalet maintains: "Passions [may] take their origin from the body [or...] from a particular turn or habit of the Imagination" (176). I am of the understanding that Mangogul's 'habit of imagination' is indulged in this novel. I am not assuming the basis on which Diderot wrote his novel; however I am engaging the textual evidence which leads me to this conclusion. Diderot writes: "We are delighted that the jewels deign to speak our language and contribute to the conversation" (24). So, here we are able to detect that he is engaging materialist philosophy in a way recognizably distinct from conventional eighteenth century literary tropes.

The dangers of the new tellers of tales threaten both Mangogul and the women.

Even though Mangogul has the ability to free the vaginal speech, he does not possess the power to control the subject matter and how it impacts his relationship with Mirzoza jewel. Adjacent to Foucault's discussion of power and sex politics, my standpoint is that sex cannot be divorced from power and in this case, whilst Mangogul has the ability to retrieve information (a power exercised through the ring), the jewels have the power to arrest the attention of the men and women in the court. Mangogul and the jewels are forced between the binaries of power and subjection. Mangogul cannot interrogate the jewels without his magical ring and the jewels - although creating scandalous conversation which instills dread in the Congolese court- are incapable of doing so without Mangogul casting his ring upon them. The relationship between Mangogul and the jewels is therefore a complex one. Foucault asserts:

One must not suppose that there exists a certain sphere of sexuality that would be the legitimate concern of a free and disinterested scientific inquiry were it not the object of mechanisms of prohibition brought to bear by the economic or ideological requirements of power. If sexuality was constituted as an area of investigation, this was only because relations of power had established it as a possible object, and conversely if power was able to take it as a target, this was because techniques of knowledge and procedures of discourse were capable of investing it. (*History of Sexuality* 1: 26)

Foucault discusses the interplay between sexuality and power. Power is assumed over sexuality as a means for subjugation to delineate the presence of power, cultivated through specific ways of reifying it. The spiritual superiors and academicians of the Congolese court investigate the jewels' chatter, using their knowledge in an attempt to comprehend its presence. These conversations conferred the respective views on genital discourse from one discipline to the other.

This then is the premise upon which the curiosity of the location of the voice is built. For the members of the Congolese court, there now exists an opportunity to engage in conversation with a voice that promises to unveil the sexual taboos of their women; these stories are implicitly taboo by virtue of the place from which

they are told. Because Mangogul decides that these tales need to be told, there exists a visible expansion of this curiosity among the members of the Congolese society. That curiosity filters from Mangogul to the Brahmins, to the academicians and so on. Mangogul's interest concerning the chatter of the jewels is ultimately what is at play within the stratum of the Congolese society in Diderot's novel. Dr Orcotomus, in his theorization of the talking genitalia of the women, concludes:

[J]udging from the circumstances under which most of the jewels spoke, and from the things that they said, there is every reason to believe it [the speaking] is involuntary and that these would have remained mute had it been within the power of the owners to silence them. (*Indiscreet Jewels* 31-2, quotations in original)

We may argue then that Mangogul possesses the ability to provoke the jewels' speech as he is the only one able to access its entrance. He points his finger at the vagina of the particular woman piquing his interest, and only then, does her vagina speak. Mangogul is urged by his own perverse desire to pursue whichever jewel he wishes to and: "To him who rings it shall be opened". Valérie Lastinger, who writes about Diderot's ability to silence women, says that "desire plays in Diderot a mainspring role in the pursuit of knowledge" (139). As Mangogul exerts his 'desire for knowledge' and the satisfaction fulfilling that *knowledge-pleasure* (also the knowledge of pleasure); he exercises control over an uncontrollable throbbing of the 'tongue' (which I asserted was the clitoral stimulation by the Sultan's ring). What this action involves is a natural friction of opposing forces being set against each other; Lastinger notes that "opposition springs from the patriarchal schism operated between nature and culture, between body and mind ("Word of Mouth, Word of Womb" 139).

This schism is the cleavage in which the discourse of the jewels runs, splitting through the cultural implications of Mangogul as patriarch and his projections upon the body. Foucault says that: "Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power" (23). How then does this resistance operate? At this point it should be clear that the jewel itself, functions as this resistance, reactive point of

contact for Mangogul which offers a complex and explicitly engaging manifesto on behalf of themselves. In a fit of power-to-power exchange, the jewels acquire for themselves the liberty of self expression regardless of Mangogul's tampering to see how their expression is exercised. They speak as divine and restless spirits. Their mistresses manipulate with the words of their mouths; yet with the words of their genital voice, they in fact speak. The truth of who the mistress is springs forth from her genital voice. One thing that constantly displays the image of the genitalia is the voice. Just as the voice issues from a place which no one sees; so the stories told by the jewels remind those who hear them of the secrecy under which the sensual scandals are performed. The actuality of the stories emphasizes the agency of the body which goes by its own will, unto its own desires and destination. This is thus the proof of the lack of control over that which seems to be repressed; for even though Mangogul devises a strategy to unlocking the jewel, the fact that they speak, confirms that no one possesses the power to what goes into it, and exactly what comes out of it. Foucault imagines that:

Resistances do not derive from a few heterogenous principles; but neither are they a lure or a promise that is of necessity betrayed. They are the odd term in relations of power; they are inscribed in the latter as an irreducible opposite. (*History of Sexuality* 1:24)

It is therefore problematic to ignore the jewels thinking that they are not points of resistance because they highlight uncommunicative images; but it is exactly their power to reveal which calls for resistance. Even with Mangogul's removal of the ring, nothing can destroy the accounts inherent in their tales or the fact that the jewels recount them without instruction or requiring permission to do so. Furthermore Foucault argues:

Hence they [resistances] too are distributed in irregular fashion: the points, knots, or focuses of resistance are spread over time at varying densities, at times mobilizing groups of individuals in a definitive way, inflaming points of the body, certain moments in life, certain types of behaviour. Are there no great radical ruptures, massive binary fissures then? Occasionally yes. But more often one is dealing with mobile and transitory points of resistance, producing cleavages in a society that shift about, fracturing

unities and effecting regroupings, furrowing across individuals themselves, cutting them up and remoulding them, marking off irreducible regions in them, in their bodies and minds. (*History of Sexuality* 1:24)

Foucault's argument delves right into the issue concerning the jewels. Their resistance inflamed points of the body, this can be seen in the burning jewel at the masked ball; they indeed cause furrows between individuals causing unities to dismantle; and finally they dislocate the entities of mind and body; the voice of truth usually known to issue from the head now issues from the genitals, the mind redoubles and relocates to the jewel consequently shutting the original voice to express the true voice. Thomas Kavanagh comments on this language of truth as spoken by the genital voice, he says:

Thanks to the *power* of Cucufa's gift, the [...] body will speak. It will express itself in a language of truth, a language magically stripped of its inherent power to deceive. ("Language as Deception" 103, my emphasis)

The power of Cucufa's gift exerts the same kind of magical power onto the jewels and by this they attain the power inherent in truth which surpasses the 'deception inherent in language'. By this the language of the women themselves are nullified. Note Foucault's reading of power in relation to Kavanagh's discussion on language and deception:

The omnipresence of power: not because it has the privilege of consolidating everything under its invincible unity, but because it produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another. Power is everywhere, not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere. And "Power" insofar as it is permanent, repetitious, inert and self-producing, is simply the over-all effect that emerges from all these mobilities. (*History of Sexuality* 1:21)

It is in this way that the voice of the jewels speaks publicly and is audible in the streets of Congo; also the word of their words spread, so their omnipresence is doubly recognized. The identities of the women are contained by their characteristic frames but as corporeal entities they are stretched and extended by their vaginal voice. The chatter of jewels invents a subject of their own,

completely unfamiliar to the academies. They produce a forward-thinking 'effort of the human mind'. Those who endeavour to research the chattering jewels phenomenon are seen as the leaders in new knowledge and founders of sublime intelligence. The academicians are acknowledged for their work in the field of the speaking jewels. The bodily/genital voice extends the body and its uses. Now, the body is not only able to function primarily but also secondarily: At its primary level, it moves physiologically and biologically; at its secondary level it pursues intelligence and presents its own materialist ideology.

...

1.2 A(L)ABIAN NIGHTS

There is a way to represent one's cause and in so doing to treat the audience in such a [...] condescending manner that they are bound to notice one is not doing it to please them. The principle should always be not to make concessions to those who don't have anything to give but who have everything to gain from us.

(Robert Greene *The Art of Seduction* 2001)

A resonating sound is produced by the evocation of the speaking vagina, peculiar and flippant. Such is the voice of the jewel in Diderot's tale. It is loud, distinct and distinguished. The voice of the jewel disseminates its own discourse. It provokes a series of reactions as its message stresses its alarming presence. For Diderot there is something ethereal about this chatter of the jewels:

There is however a portion of [...] sexual discourse which for Diderot escapes mimetism - hysterio-mystical discourse. [He] understands hysterical discourse as essentially mystical. He notes the link between hysteria, sexuality and mysticism: "Nothing is more contiguous than ecstasy, vision, prophecy, revelation, fiery poetry and hysterism" (Lastinger 135)

Taking into account the author's disposition concerning hysterism it is seen that the reflection of this idea is prominent in Mangogul's understanding of the same subject: "The vapours! Cicogne calls them hysterics, which means things that come from the lower region. He has a divine elixir for it; it is a principle, principating,

principiated, which revives (*Indiscreet Jewels* 19).

Mangogul does not specify in this above excerpt whether the elixir meant for the hysterics serves to amplify their discourse or to silence it. Let us imagine it then from both sides. When labial discourse is incited, we find ourselves at a point where the body catapults into a space beyond its limitations. As Carol Bynum observes, there is a state of embodiment that seems immeasurable and contravening. It is called into existence by the silencing of the facial mouth; those lips are shut to give vent to the ideas which the jewel holds. Cicogne's elixir is however said to 'revive' - in other words 'resurrect' - the voice of the lower region. One of Doctor Orcotomus's theories concerning the never-before-heard voice and discourse of the jewel, centres on the same principle of reviving the jewel voice: "[He argues that] the jewels have always spoken, but so softly that what they said at times was barely audible, even to those to whom they belonged" (*The Indiscreet Jewels* 31).

By exploring the features of his magical ring Mangogul discovered that he could heighten the volume of the jewel voice and finally hear the whispers rise to a full-blown cry. The ring has brought to life the voice of the jewel and actually proven that it exists, where it would otherwise have remained silent. On the other side of speech there is silence.

Orcotomus renders the question of why the jewels have chosen to speak at the specific time that they did. The silence masking their voice before they are granted the gift of speaking, is reminiscent of a curtain veiling the grand finale or showstopper, which when the spotlight falls upon it, reveals shocking images evoked from the stories they retell. Henceforth, it is logical to reason that the silence preceding the unveiling stirs up the expectancy for an approaching greatness, a spectacular spectacle. The anticipation which forebodes the grandeur of speech emanating from the jewels functions as a state of arousal for both the women who are ringed and the Sultan himself. However, for the women, it is the anxiety associated with relinquishing control to their second set of lips, which causes their state of arousal; for the Sultan, it is the excitement of expectancy

made manifest in his ability to possess such an unfair advantage and control over that second set of lips. Mangogul says:

Society can only benefit tremendously from this duplication of faculties. Possibly we men, in turn shall one day speak from somewhere other than the mouth. Who can tell? That which accords itself so perfectly well with jewels might be destined to question and answer them (*Indiscreet Jewels* 24)

The dichotomy between male and female conversation is being extrapolated by Mangogul as a means to facilitate conjugal conversation. To marry the male counterparts to those of the female, would be to insinuate that there is a mutual exchange between the respective discourses. However, I suggest we treat labial discourse as an independent contribution to what is being said about how the body *textualises* itself (so to speak) to an audience most likely convinced that its voice is non-existent. What are then the effects of a different kind of corporeal discourse? How does one contend with its sudden and provocative presence, drawing attention to itself?

Natania Meeker seeks out to establish the workings of what she calls voluptuous philosophy and how it alludes to the secrets innate in the body, now coming to light by the jewels' ability to express themselves. She engages the Sadean concept whereby the materialization of the body functions as "the burning need to portray everything [;] and to penetrate into the bosom of Nature" (*Voluptuous Philosophy* 2). In Casanovian terms the display of the body emerges for the interest of the scopophilic gaze, for the self-induced pleasure of watching and reveling in the decadence of the spectacle. What Meeker suggests is that for materialists like Diderot, this bodily portrayal renders itself as an idea, not as the image itself. It is the retelling of the stories of the jewels which give them their mysticism. The jewels' gift of narration in Diderot's novel magnifies not only the intelligence of this mystic organ but also its ability to conjure and frame, recite and explain.

Their need to retell and narrate their stories provides a sense of mastery that cannot be debased by perceiving them as mere chatter, perilous and uncontrolled;

but as tellers of tales and by that, creators of imagery dominating the direction of their own narrative. Hans Blumenberg comments on the eighteenth-century author as supporting the “elementary exertions of the modern age: the *mathematizing* and *materializing* of nature” (qtd in *Voluptuous Philosophy* 2, emphasis in original). The significance of mathematizing nature explores the logic and calculation of a set of structures. This alludes to the fact that the jewels, because of their proficient speech, are equipped to navigate through those narrative structures to produce a discourse, rich and volatile, laced with a set of symbols serving to restructure our understanding of how the language of the body becomes transmuted.

If we take the episode in which Fanni’s jewel speaks, we will be able to trace the idiosyncrasies present in the expression of the jewel voice:

I have quite a memory, as you can see, but I am like all the others. I have retained the smallest part of what has been confided to me. Therefore be thus content with what I have told you, for I can think of nothing more. One would think that I have nothing more than chattering to think about! All right let us chatter, since it is required of us; perhaps when I have said all, I shall be allowed to do something else (*Indiscreet Jewels* 190)

The cognitive faculty of the jewel here reserves an archive of experience and knowledge. However, it does not divulge it in its entirety; but rather undertakes to confront its listeners’ perceptions of its working; it contests their notion that it has an isolated function of mere chatter. Rather wittingly, it resolves to indulge its listeners with seductive and shocking stories, after which, it wants to be left about its business in peace. The spirited nature of Fanni’s jewel is a fascinating site for recognizing labial discourse as that which precipitates the subliminal activity of its own conscience. Meeker expounds on the actuality that “the role of material bodies [is to shape] the nature of apprehension, defining the limits of the human, and structuring the project of enlightenment that links knowledge to forms of emancipation” (*Voluptuous Philosophy* 2, parenthesis in original).

The idea that speaking is an act of performance, speaks to the guise of silence.

That the jewels choose to remain subdued and by ringing are then forced to give vent to their tales, underscore the authenticity of their discourse. The mystery of labial discourse determines the veracity of its contents. The dynamism of labial discourse is at once as Meeker notes “an explicitly poetic rendering of the visible and invisible world” (*Voluptuous Philosophy* 6). Fanni’s jewel has a twist of sarcasm, relegating her speech to duty and her duty to performance. It almost mocks its own existence, and by that affirming its covert power. The jewel has the ability to perform dual actions of speech and action, on the exact same premise of intelligibility. Mirzoza reflects “[I]f our jewels could explain all our fancies, they would be wiser than we” (99).

Here Mirzoza, in the guise of a philosopher, understands the natural inclination of the jewels as being acquired wisdom through pleasure and knowledge. Furthermore, upon the silence of Fanni’s jewel, Diderot writes:

Fanni's jewel fell silent [...] One of the main characteristics of these orators was that they stopped themselves at the right moment. They spoke as if they had never done anything else. And from this fact several authors concluded that they were merely machines. The argument went as follows: [...] Here the African author repeats in its entirety the Cartesians metaphysical argument against the souls of animals, which with all possible sagacity he applied to the jewels' chatter. In a word, his opinion was that jewels speak the way birds sing; that is, perfectly, without having learned how, being prompted undoubtedly from above. (*Indiscreet Jewels* 198)

Diderot explains this mechanical habit of jewel-speech as something divine, something which they were assigned and designed to do. The jewels speak as if they had never done anything else; this focuses in on Fanni’s jewel coming to terms with its intelligence by recalling its stories from a memory we become acquainted with. Fanni’s jewel speaks so eloquently as if it had forgotten that it had any other function besides speaking. In Immanuel Kant’s essay (“An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment”) he deliberates that : “When nature has [...] developed the seed for which she cares most tenderly—namely, the inclination and vocation for free thinking—this works back upon the character of

the people who thereby become more and more capable of acting freely [...]” (qtd in *Voluptuous Philosophy* 1). The act of emancipation, earlier touched upon, again makes its appearance here in Kant’s observation. Corporeality seeking to be freed will emancipate itself through the act of free thinking, a physical manifestation of what is bound in the body. This act of free thinking accentuates mortality in a way that heightens our consciousness thereof. This amplifies the association between stories of the body being inscribed upon the memory of both the listeners and the jewel itself. Oration is a means of retelling memory in a way that makes it accessible and comprehensible; a clear sign that that which speaks, is a thinking machine. By confirming its existence through oration the jewel is then able to delineate its mortality in the company of the court, in itself a representation of society. Meeker exemplifies the conditions of society by surmising that:

The human subject is comprehensively describable as “susceptible to two kinds of movement; some are substantial movements whereby the entire body or some of its parts are visibly transferred from one place to another; others are internal or hidden movements, of which some we can feel while others are accomplished without our knowledge and can only be guessed at from the effects they produce on the outside (*Voluptuous Philosophy* 3).

The externalization of the hidden movements of the jewel causes the court to gasp and become ostensibly disrupted. Mirzoza alerts Mangogul: “I do not know what benefit you will reap from your ring; but the more you try it, the more odious my sex becomes to me: even those whom I thought merited some esteem are not exempted from this” (*Indiscreet Jewels*, 97). For Mirzoza, the covert nature of her jewel is regarded as a symbol of respectability. By disclosing its hidden movements as Meeker asserts, the very sheath of her self-respect becomes abhorrent. If jewels now possess the ability to speak, then it becomes the mystic who divulges the secrets of oracles thus the engendered discourse allows the vagina to speak back to its interrogator, the ring. The Brahmins’ advice to the women upon whom the ring is turned, is as follows: “Submit to the will of Brahma. Allow the voice of your jewel to awaken the voice of your conscience, and do not blush at confessing the crimes you had no shame to commit” (*Indiscreet Jewels*, 61). The fictional Casanova muzzles his penis so as to hold back his seminal fluid or ‘the procreative

word" as Lovric describes it. Looking at these separate fictionalizations of genitalia possessing the gift of the word or discourse, it becomes clear that the representation of the body in eighteenth century fiction and reflections thereof, poses it as a locus of innate knowledge.

In order for the religious leaders to theologize the presence of a vaginal voice, they have to contend with the significance of it. If the jewels speak by divine involvement then their effects should prove to revive their society, for they too have been revived. If they confess and renounce their shame, then by the act of speaking they should be able to prove that the discourse being executed prescribes a discussion instead of a monologue. This then, could be taken to be the threat to those discussants involved in the topic of their choice, at that specific point of intercourse.

If the jewels know only of scandalous recollections from a faded memory, why is it then so important for the Sultan to amuse himself with this particular pastime? Meeker states that "[m]an should have recourse to physics and experience in his quest for knowledge"—to a diagnosis of the human body as a signifying system, partially legible to itself through an analysis of the effects of sensation on its surfaces and in its interior" (*Voluptuous Philosophy* 3). What Mangogul does is affirm that his journey through the so-called misadventures of the jewels lends itself to firstly relieve his boredom and secondly to satiate an inbred curiosity. The covert nature of the scandals after which he seeks, leads him to uncover the women's genital voice, so they can speak on behalf of themselves and not be interceded for by the tongues of the women. By the direct application of his ring, he acknowledges that the power of labial discourse is an equal force to the symbol of his royal ring.

The ring of Cucufa most explicitly contends with the jewels not as gendered separates but as interlocutors of the same social stratum. The leveling of Mangogul's power to that of the labia, speaks to the dynamic between the power of social superiority and the force of the jewels' knowledge. It stimulates debate amongst the intellectuals and religious orders of the Congolese society in Diderot's

novel. Jewel sharpens jewel and the debate is that which is made of the same material. Something immaterial is born out of the interaction between the two jewels.

The sensory involvement in the stimulation of the jewel in Diderot's novel, initiates the conversation. If the jewel is first aroused, it has no other option but to release its reserved insights. The cause for stimulation in the first place is brought about by pleasure-seeking, and then curiosity which forms the duality which further bolsters the intrigue of seeking first what pleases man and secondly what keeps him in conversation with his own *knowledge-pleasure* and this is the direct inter-stimulation of his own desires.

...

1.3 THE SOUL OF CORPOREALITY

*We're dazzled by feminine adornment, by the surface,
All gold and jewels: so little of what we observe is the girl herself
And where (you may ask) amid such plenty can our object of passion be found?
The eye's deceived by Love's smart camouflage.*

(Ovid *Cures for Love*, 1983 trans. P. Green)

Diderot redefines the body according to the location of its soul. It may seem that the two aspects function according to two respective sets of systems: the soul according to intellectual or spiritual faculties; the body according to the material and physical faculties. Mirzoza, who interrogates the Sultan Mangogul, offers an idea that completely disrupts the notion that the soul and body are two separate entities. Not only does she imagine that the soul is contained within the body, but beyond this, she imagines that whichever singular entity governs the body, it is here wherein the soul lies.

Miran Božovič writes a compelling piece on this very topic, he says of the novel:

[Its] philosophy is expounded by the body itself. In this philosophical fantasy, the body itself has come to speak. The body has a speech organ of its own: it speaks through the organ that is traditionally considered to be the least submissive to the soul or mind—that is, through the organ that also serves as the reproductive organ, called euphemistically by Diderot *le bijou*, the jewel. These are perhaps the only words in history of philosophy not spoken by the soul or the mind, but by the body (“The Omniscient Body” 17).

Drawing from my previous argument, that the body reserves an archive of memory and experience, in the light of the above statement, it is because of the overflow

of this very collection of memories that it is able to speak. The soul is formed in the womb of the carrier of a new body, or the womb of its mother. It is thus a point of interest for me, that the organ then more appropriately equipped to speak, is the jewel. I prefer to treat, for the purposes of my individual exploration and interaction with the text, the organ of reproduction as the womb, and the organ of speech as the jewel. The jewel is then a passageway towards and out of the womb, and carries the message of the soul in Diderot's novel. In some way the mouth of the womb is its seat of reception and pleasure and in accordance with Mangogul's reasoning, the most informed to speak of these things which they alone know.

The women in Diderot's *Congo*, have the appearance of veiled treasure troves. Orcotomus deduces that the jewels have always spoken; yet may have gone unheard because the volume of their voice was barely audible. If a culture projects its own misperceptions onto the idea that jewels are able to speak, how then, would the jewel react if it had no foreknowledge of its own ability to speak? It is likely that the women, whose jewels cause a stir by their mere utterances, are also startled by the presence of their jewel voice. It is also noteworthy that the jewels take direction not from the women in question, but as living entities themselves, not directly influenced by the women who carry them. This signifies a dialect present only in the body; a dialect only understood by the body and therefore the voice is able to go about its duties when prompted to do so. This dialect can more accurately be treated as the voice of the soul, whereby its ideas are its conscience and its proclamation is executed through the vaginal voice.

Mangogul, on acquiring the ring for the first time, contemplates ringing his own lover Mirzoza as she sleeps. He questions his own actions but more importantly, their outcome: "If her jewel took it upon itself to talk extravagantly, I should see her no more and die of sorrow. And who knows what a jewel may have in its soul?" (*Indiscreet Jewels* 14). Even though Mangogul possesses a device which seemingly forces it to speak, it also has the ability to know just when to be quiet; it is also self-inspired, self-stimulated.

Of Alcina's jewel, it is said that "this adventure caused a great stir not only at

court and in town, but all over Congo. Poems circulated about it. The discourse of Alcina's jewel was published, revised, corrected, enlarged and commented on by the darlings of the court" (*Indiscreet Jewels* 19). The voice of the jewel is immediately contended and grappled with. By its discourse it is able to stimulate discussion and intrigue, much like that of philosophic enquiry. Drawing alongside Mangogul's question concerning the content of the jewel's soul, it is relevant to look at Mirzoza's philosophic circumspection as she engages Mangogul on the presence of the soul. It is apparent that Mangogul, initially using the ring as relief to his tedious quotidian existence, is now also at odds with the vocal presence of the jewel:

For my part I believe that a jewel makes a woman do a hundred things of which she is unaware; and I have noticed on more than one occasion that a woman who thought she was following her head was actually obeying her jewel. A great philosopher placed the soul- ours, that is- in the pineal gland. If I granted a woman a soul, I know very well where I would place it (*Indiscreet Jewels* 99)

The distinction between the pineal gland and the clitoris, assigns a masculine dominance over the way in which a woman reasons. If women are to function optimally, as intellectual and spiritual beings, by his consent he would have them function from their vaginal space. This poses a contrast to the fact that the pineal gland is seated in the brain; making it seem as if women only function hysterically and that the soul of the womb restricts its own consciousness. However, Mirzoza speaks back to his idea as astutely as a philosopher. She does not relinquish the momentum of the debate by being curt; instead she is elaborate in her analysis and wordy in her commentary:

"Did the philosophers of Monoemugi, who presided over Your Highness's education, ever hold forth on the nature of the soul?"

"Oh yes, often," answered Mangogul, "but all their systems succeeded only in giving me vague notions of it; and without an inner feeling that might suggest to me it is a substance different from matter, I would either have denied its existence or confused it with that of the body. Are you undertaking to clarify this mess?" (*Indiscreet Jewels* 120-1)

Mangogul touches on something very important here. He unravels the idea on which this entire argument is built - he does so, without exactly noticing or further deconstructing it. He mentions that he requires an inner feeling in order to be convinced of the existence of the soul. That statement becomes ambiguous when we consider he is evoking a feeling, an arousal in the jewels of the women, one which influences them to speak. If the soul cannot be materialized as separate to the body, the idea that it exists seems preposterous. However, he is now confronted with the materialization of the souls of women. It also sets up the soul as something as primal and physical as the body.

Mangogul is in disbelief as his rationalization of this concept is being overturned and re-imagined from the bottom up, instead of the convention of reasoning from the top down (in reference to the location of the pineal gland in the head). The argument construes that the jewel speaks toward the mental faculties; that the body too can make sense of its own workings instead of relying on the mind to project a systematic analysis of why and how it functions.

Božovič merges the infinity of spirituality to corporeality:

Diderot came up with the idea of the speaking body. Firmly believing that the body knows more about itself and its soul than the soul knows about itself and its body, Diderot presents the philosophy of materialism as the body's discourse on itself. In contrast to spiritualism, where the soul is distinct from the body it animates, in materialism, where the soul is nothing other than the 'organization of life' of the body itself, we encounter a body that is its own soul. ("The Omniscient Body" 17)

This alludes to Mangogul trying to comprehend what constitutes the soul to begin with. There could be no conclusive arguments from his philosophic mentors for his enquiry on the subject of the soul. With the revival of the jewel voice, he is forced to understand the soul as something material. In earlier versions of the novel, the jewels are named toys, which coincide with Božovič's supposition that the soul is the body. It goes to say that the soul travels within the limbs and parts of the body, emphasizing that the two are not separate entities but rather that the body

is its own soul. . What Božovič now suggests is that we think on this interaction not as the one dominating the other, but that the one is the other. He suggests a kind of possession of the body by its own soul; that the movement of the soul is in harmony with the body and not separate from it; that the soul does not offer a perfunctory purpose to the presence of the body. Furthermore, let us examine Mirzoza's argument on the subject:

They pronounced that the soul is in the head, whereas most men die without it ever having dwelt there, for its first place of residence is in the feet [dwelling connoting movement, restlessness]

We have all seen that in infancy the sleeping soul remains whole months in a state of torpor. The eyes open without sight, the mouth without speech, the ears without hearing. Elsewhere the soul seeks to expand and awaken; and only in other limbs does it exercise its first functions. A child's formation is first announced with his feet. His body, head and arms are immobile in his mother's womb, but his feet stretch out, kick and manifest his existence and needs. Come time to be born, what would become of the head, body, and arms- they could never leave the prison without the help of the feet: the feet play the principal role, and chase the rest of the body before them. Such is the natural order, and when any other limb tries to mix itself up in their command, when the head for example takes the place of the feet, everything turns askew, and God knows what sometimes befalls the mother of the child (*Indiscreet Jewels* 120, parenthesis added).

As aforementioned, the soul is formed in the womb, as Mirzoza puts it, the sleeping soul in its state of stupor. Again, the magnification of the soul comes into question: it finds a means to magnify itself through the extension of its limbs. The voice of the jewel recollects the origins of its own voice by stressing the maker of its soul, the womb. The soul is bred in womb and migrates, as Božovič would have it, to its distinctive location throughout the existence of the body. Colebrook understands that "a group of bodies connect to expand their power; this is desire. That same group of bodies forms an image of themselves as the very ground of human life; this is interest" (*Gilles Deleuze* 93). The collective of jewels whose chatter permeates throughout the Congolese court, becomes a source of

voluptuousness for intriguing the interest of the community in which they find themselves arrested.

The soul, according to Božovič, became stuck in the jewel. It has journeyed through the body of the women in question and stationed itself in her jewel. It may not so much as become stuck in a static place, than be brought to that place by the interrogation of the ring. If we consider Fanni's jewel wanting to be released so she can perform something other than retell her own scandals; then maybe it is correct to view that something other as the migrating to another part of the body as Božovič calls it. If migration is the work of the soul from its inception, then the habitation of the jewel is just a nomadic expression of the fluidity of the soul's habitat. Božovič concedes that:

[A] soul that is identical with the body - [...] is none other than the function of the organ in which it manifests itself: an effect of corporeal organization. Therefore, when the body rebels against the women who believe themselves to be spiritual substances in command of the body to which they are united, it is in fact the soul which is identical with the body or with its organization that really rebels against them, and *objects to the false portrayal of its seat - and function - in the body* ("The Omniscient Body" 20, emphasis in original)

Solidarity is shown between the body and its soul which somehow betrays the union of the mind to the body. In the organization of the material body, how would the location of the mind interact with this inseparable union of soul and body? The material mind would play the role of a facilitator of the curiosities between the unified corporeal soul, and its external projections. The organization of the materials involved in the sustenance of the body as an object, derives its system from the extension of itself. It bears semblance to the body being a representative of the soul, without which the soul cannot speak. If the vaginal voice speaks aloud, it is only because it is en route to further displace itself which in turn testifies to its omniscience in the body. Thus, it interprets the vocation of the soul, as a constant dislocation and relocation in the singular space of the corporeal. Mirzoza further illustrates:

It seems to me that one could argue that in childhood the head rules the feet, and that from the head issue the spirits. Spreading through the nerves into all the other limbs, these spirits stop or activate them according to the will of the soul, which resides in the pineal gland [...] In childhood there is no certainty that the head thinks, and you yourself, my lord, who have such a good head and who, in your most tender years, passed for a prodigy, do you remember thinking at that time?

I maintain that the other limbs are always subordinated to the one in which the soul resides (*Indiscreet Jewels* 124).

Mirzoza presumes that the seat of the soul resides in the head initially, for the head rules the feet. However, it is rather the soul which pursues its own seat for its functions outside the bounds of reason. The women's jewels speak at random and as if mid way of an ongoing conversation with its corresponding collective of jewels. It seeks always to manifest itself as Mirzoza points out that the ears open without hearing and the eyes without sight. The soul can be viewed in this light as a primordial entity, existing outside the organization of the corporeal yet not without it. Additionally, Mirzoza supposes:

Thus the voluptuous woman is she whose soul, resides in her jewel, and never strays from there. As for nature, if we look at her through the eyes of experience, we learn that she has placed the soul in man's body as if in a vast palace, in which it does not always occupy the finest chambers. The head and the heart are the principal destinations intended for it, as the center of virtue and the site of truth; but more often it stops along the way, preferring a hovel, a place of dubious character, or a miserable inn where it goes to sleep in perpetual torpor. (*Indiscreet Jewels* 126)

The desire of the soul to move from the seat of sensuality, speaks to its ability to transform into a myriad of personalities. The multiplicity with which the soul conducts itself within the body, speaks of truth as noted by Mirzoza. The kind of truth I surmise, of which the soul speaks when passing through the canal of the jewel, is that which confirms that the body maintains a sense of fluidity which casts a striking contrast in the debate around its duality involving the mind. It is

able to redouble as Diderot would have it, and it is also able to isolate specific spaces within itself in which to amplify its innate experience of life. The body does not will its extensions into submission but rather treats itself as the will from which its characterized habits are performed, it leads itself to whichever location best suits it, in whichever way it chooses to represent itself at whichever moment. Diderot, the materialist, finds expression for determining his own approach to this subject in his fictionalization of the speaking body.

...

Chapter 2

Memoirs of Jean-Jacques Casanova - Casanova de Seignalt

2.1 BODIES ON DISPLAY

“He is a consummate master in the dignified narration of undignified experiences.”

-Havelock Ellis

“A strange man who made himself valued everywhere and was everywhere worthless. Casanova will remain in history and in literature the most lively expression of the 18th century; which such a man seems to condense himself; sceptical like Diderot without Diderot’s talent and honesty; libertine like Crébillon the younger without his grace and charm; a rascally infidel and obscene rake, Casanova lived as a philosopher and died as a Christian.”

-George Sand

“But in spite of all he was the first among adventurers. To analyze the book would be like trying to analyze his life. It evades the scalpel. There is never a grain of reason; there is little religion and less conscience.”

-Alfred de Musset

“Casanova never describes; his impressions come out naturally through his story in revealing lines [...] [H]e almost unconsciously gives us the nuances which make local colour real. He has left us the most animated and most illuminative of pictures of the Europe of the 18th century.”

-Le Gras

My interest in Casanova’s writing spawns from Michelle Lovric’s debut novel, *Carnevale* (2010). I have since decided to independently research what was described so elaborately in Lovric’s writing. Casanova is valued and esteemed as the genius lover; an intelligence I thought would be interesting to unpack. For Lovric, the fictionalised character of Casanova was ‘human lusts written larger than life’; ‘a trademark for louche behaviour’ (*Carnevale* 15).

While Lovric's novel praises Casanova's approach to wooing women as a historical occurrence, there have been instances in which his *Memoirs* have been taken to be fiction, and his character compared to the likes of Don Juan and Don Quijote. Therefore I will focus on the narrative voice without making judgements concerning its veracity. In his "Summary of my Life", a prelude to his memoirs, Casanova provides us with a brief account of his days of infancy. He sketches a picture of his habits and inconsistencies. Casanova speaks of himself as being a rather weak, sickly and unattractive child. He writes:

My mother brought me into the world in Venice the 2nd of April on Easter day of the year 1725. The night before, she felt a craving for shrimps. I am very fond of them. I was christened Jacques-Jerôme. I was an idiot up to the age of eight and a half. After a hemorrhage lasting three months, I was sent to Padua, where cured of idiocy, I studied diligently and at the age of sixteen I became a doctor and was given the priest's robes to make my fortune in Rome (*Memoirs* 11).

The first impressions of this Casanova are bland, uneventful and almost ghastly. A mute who loves shrimps and becomes a man of the cloth is not the generic representation of a man who is now, centuries later, called the 'genius lover'. What about this introduction serves to establish the vivacity of the character we come to know as Casanova? Casanova does not judge himself according to his initial characteristics; he rather tells his story freely and unashamedly. His ability to laboriously recount his tales of failure and fortune is placed against his inability to summarize his life events in the same opulent manner as he does his *Memoirs*.

The delicate process of separation needs to be made between the 'literary persona of Giacomo Casanova' as Jay Caplan would have it, and Casanova, the writer of his *Memoirs*; although the two are seemingly inseparable (Vicarious *Jouissances*: or Reading Casanova 803). Casanova, as writer, is aware of the self-revelatory versus the self-exploratory through the fictionalization of his own identity in his memoirs. It is in his preface to *The Story of My Life* - a work separate from his memoirs - that he reveals this kind of self-consciousness concerning the graphic representation of his own escapades:

Si quelquefois on trouve que je ne peins certaines scenes amoureuses avec trop de détails, qu'on se garde de me blâmer, à moins qu'on ne me trouve un mauvais peintre, puis qu'on ne saurait faire un reproche à ma vieille âme de ne savoir plus jouir que par reminiscence. [If at times it seems that I paint not loves scenes with sufficient details, then I wish not to be blamed. Unless one finds I am a painter of mediocre standards then do not reprimand me; instead grant my old soul the pleasure of mere recollection] ("Preface" *Story of My Life* 30)

What Casanova asks is that the reader grants his old soul those 'innocent pleasures' in recounting those particular scenes containing the graphic detail with which he does. He asks permission to paint those decadent scenes in its specificity; he wishes to be set at liberty to describe those 'undignified experiences' in its 'obscenity' as, according to Caplan, Judeo-Christian terminology would have it (803). Smollett, more astutely than Casanova, pardons himself by asserting solidarity between his desire and that of the reader to 'relish the disgrace and discomfiture of vice'. However, he does not explicitly admit that this is the secret desire of the reader and of himself: to have access to a tantalizing picture of depravity through the fictionalization of Fathom's adventures and character. He rather cleverly steers the reader's scopophilic desire to gaze upon that world and that picture towards an approach of heightening terror. There is an element of sensitivity which seems to mask his desire to indulge in looking upon the erotic delicacies contained in Fathom's adventures. Casanova, on the other hand, conveys a somewhat defeated stance to this storytelling. Unlike Smollett, who seems to have a firm moral sensitivity - justifying his description of the immoral Fathom's depravities - Casanova rather pathetically asks that the reader grant him the joys of telling his tale without returning it with judgement. Casanova retreats to the position of being at the mercy of the reader's gaze, who will make the final judgement about the graphic nature of his writings. Smollett refrains from placing himself in the position of 'asking'. He does not ask the reader to allow him to revel in the *jouissance* of recounting Fathom's stories; but rather he esteems himself as being free from any condemnation associated with the judgement the reader may direct towards his work of erotic fiction.

In a somewhat recanting fashion, Smollett tries to explain that his motivation for anticipating the ‘deplorable fate’ of an anti-hero in *Fathom* - through a series of misadventures and unclean scenes - is that of wanting to teach the reader a lesson by way of warning them about the vices surrounding an iniquitous lifestyle. Casanova, more candidly, more honestly and maybe more innocently, exposes a vulnerability which seeks to affirm his dependence upon that liberty needed to uninhibitedly paint his own pictures of depravity, mischief and supposed immorality. Interestingly enough and echoing my own sentiments, Caplan draws some pertinent assumptions concerning Casanova’s dilemma. He grapples with Casanova’s intentions beneath his appeal to the reader to grant him literary freedom of expression, and asks:

Does he mean that only by remembering past *jouissances* can he once again know this (“untranslatable”) experience? At any rate, Casanova implies that he once knew *jouissance* without symbolic mediation, without mediation by the represented experience of others; experience by oneself, for oneself: that is, experience ultimately without any self, without any sense of difference between self and other (quotations and parenthesis in original, 804)

What is interesting is that Caplan uses the phrase ‘symbolic mediation’ to describe that intersection of perspectives between writer and reader. By this I mean that the writer understands that the reader is reading their work with a pre-existing ideology. The assumption of the particular nature of that ideology is then formulated and is either written into the method of narration, or is utterly disregarded. Casanova appeals to this disregard by asking the reader to free themselves of any ideological projection and in so doing frees himself to describe as he chooses. He asks that the reader may hold no preconceptions concerning the rightfulness or wrongfulness of actions in his accounts. He asks that his work be taken for what it is, what it posits, because it exists in such vivid memory, that he has no other means by which to describe it other than as he experienced it. Alfred de Musset says of Casanova that “[h]e is full of the places he visits, he has so perfectly observed the manners, known the life so intimately, that he almost unconsciously gives us the nuances which make local color real” (“Introduction”

15). If the reader disregards their lived experience which would otherwise have functioned as a projective lens; Casanova will then have negated the possibility of contaminating the purity of his accounts. By purity I mean the unmediated expression of an experience which builds itself upon the waves of voluptuous philosophy. His *Memoirs* carry surges of local colour as de Musset describes, filled with the places he has been. In Casanova's natural, almost reflexive way of describing his experiences, he invites the reader to view the movement of the body and its habits in a fluid and unassuming manner. By attributing no symbolic or cultural significance to his descriptions, he aligns himself, maybe accidentally, maybe not, to the voluptuous philosophy intrinsic in 18th century culture.

"Bettine" is one of Casanova's more famous chapters. Bettine is his caregiver and the older erotic counterpart who provokes dormant lusts from his 12-year-old body. In one of the richest pieces in his *Memoirs*, Casanova brings to light the autonomy of corporeal responses, and the suggestive way they operate regardless of their contextual or spatial restraints:

She came every morning to comb my hair, often before I was up, saying that she had not time to wait until I was dressed. She washed my face, neck and breast, and petted me in a way which was innocent enough but which excited and mortified me. (*Memoirs* 23)

Casanova puts a halt to the innocent way in which he regards Bettine's petting at first. He says she was very fond of him and took care of him very diligently. Casanova seems to think of his young self and body as being at the defenseless end of Bettine's interaction with him. He suggests that Bettine has the advantage of age which allows her the liberty to unashamedly pet him. It is as if his body lashes out at her for tousling with the invisible margin which separates them but in effect, ultimately sews them together:

As I was three years younger than she her endearments could not possibly mean anything, and this realization put me in a bad humor. When sitting on my bed she said that I was getting stout and when furthermore she used her hands to verify this statement, she caused me the keenest emotion, but I let her do as she liked for fear that she would notice my sensitiveness. (23)

Although he shows a self-consciousness induced by the realization that Bettine is older than he is, he also represents a superior understanding which allows him to make deductions concerning the connection between his physical expressions of deep-seated emotion. Bettine's attention to detail of his body, noting his stoutness and using 'her hands to verify' what had already been observed with her eyes, gives us the idea that what we are dealing with primarily is the physical manifestations of the psyche or emotions. The young Casanova's reaction to Bettine's laying on of hands, becomes the sentiment which produces the philosophy concurrent in his work. In that one expression he suggests that 1) bodily exchanges inflict mutual reactions; 2) bodily sensitivity is reflexive and 3) the body's autonomy finds its origins in the mind. Furthermore, Casanova's more novel experiences of Bettine's 'advances' as he saw them, are entrenched in the psychological impulses churned from the emotions: "When she remarked on the softness of my skin I had a tickling sensation which made me shrink. I was angry with myself for not daring to do to her what she was doing to me, but delighted that she could not guess how I felt" (23).

He says he was 'angry for not daring to do to her *what* she was doing' to him - but *what* was that exactly? The big 'what' is at the crux of the method Casanova employs in uncovering the motivation beneath Bettine's seemingly ardent expressions of affection; especially since she also refers to him as her 'dear child' (23).

It is in discovering the motivation for 'doing' or 'acting', that we will begin to understand *what* the exact process of becoming is and *what* exactly he is becoming. In understanding this, we will have to go in search of the multiple 'whats' at play in deciphering the Casanovian body. He writes:

When I was dressed she gave me the sweetest kisses, calling me her dear child, but no matter how much I desired to follow her example I did not yet have the hardihood. Later, however, I grew bolder, and as Bettine had ridiculed my shyness I returned her kisses ardently, stopping only when I felt like going too far. At such times I turned my head, making believe I was looking for something, and then she usually left. As soon as she had gone I was desperate at not having followed nature's inclination and astonished

that Bettine untroubled could do all that she did to me, while I with the greatest effort could barely control myself. (23-4, my emphasis)

Casanova had not yet mustered up the courage to be at complete liberty to do unto Bettine, as she does unto him. This aspiration confers an almost ritualistic phasing in and out of consciousness for the young Casanova; for it is evident that in the gradual peeling away of 'shyness' Casanova acquires 'boldness'. It is this testing of thresholds which makes Casanova all the more interesting as the hero of his own adventures. Why does he make believe that he is searching for something else when in fact he is returning Bettine's 'ardent kisses'? Why does he feel aggrieved and almost envious towards her unabashed freedom to inflict pressure upon his sensitivities, leaving him barely 'able to control' himself? Is it the self-consciousness concerning his age which prolongs the duration of his shyness? Ironically, we pick up on the *mise-en-abyme* effect of Casanova's knowledge that he is being looked at through the observing eyes of Bettine.

Earlier on, we discussed his apologetic appeal to be given the right to tell his stories without the pressure of another's lived experience - in this scene Casanova describes the reflection of the same process of self-surveillance, not by gazing at one's immediate reflection, but rather gazing at oneself through the gaze of another, through the experience of another. His self-consciousness and shyness are made manifest through the implications of Bettine's gaze and her disregard for his disposition. There is the unending reflection of the gaze of the self through the eyes of another, through the reflection of the other's ever present experience. From this arises the suspicion of being too harshly judged and in turn, this spawns a stroke of self-judgement which in its simplest form is self-consciousness.

Self-consciousness is an integral part of the writer's disposition, and how the events contained within their literary piece are conveyed. By adopting a too self-conscious stance, the writer automatically recants from an explicit representation of their story; no matter how vital those details are to their narrative.

...

2.2 INTELLIGENT BODIES

Martin Heidigger describes the act of sexual intercourse as a fight to the death. The point of the orgasm is a negation of the self, the two selves involved no longer exist as human counterparts but as a culmination of pure sensual energy. In *Carnevale*, Lovric describes Cecilia and Casanova's incessant lovemaking as a war against each other's bodies: they throw themselves against each other in 'delicious combats' (35).

Casanova himself describes his encounters as 'lascivious combats' (310). Fighting and feasting seem to be the most natural point from which to take direction in this particular discussion. Casanova's appetite for physical feasting of both kinds, formulates a large part of the stories he unravels for us, but more so in how he unravels them. Feasting is imperative for the strength needed in the physical body to wage this delicious combat. Feasting also has a sacred significance as depicted in the Biblical literature of the Last Supper, where Jesus shares a meal with his twelve disciples before waging war against sin and finally sacrificing his body at the climax of the crucifixion. The two concepts fit into each other. I draw on this sacred textual concept of feasting as Casanova applies his own sacred projection to his encounters. He says of the encounter he has with twin sisters Nanette and Marton:

We often felt, all three of us, as if we must raise our souls towards the Eternal Providence of God, to thank Him for having, by His particular protection, kept us from all the accidents, which might have disturbed the sweet peace we were enjoying. (*Memoirs* 41)

Casanova marries the concepts of feasting and fighting under a sacred pretext. He seems to wrestle with his own conflicting philosophies. This speaks to the inconsistency and the ideological wrestling of the age in which he found himself. This idea of fighting or wrestling occurs repeatedly in Casanova's *Memoirs*. It is clear that Casanova, when approaching a novel sexual encounter, enjoys the idea of it being a conquest. He seems to want to subdue but, more importantly, allow

his object of desire to succumb to his advances. Look at the following excerpt, concerning his interaction with a convent girl we later come to know as Mademoiselle de la Meure:

‘Don't be afraid, if I were indiscreet I should be the first to suffer.’

‘You have given me a lesson which will come in useful. Stop! stop! Or I will go away.’

‘No, keep quiet; it's done now.’

I had taken her pretty hand, with which she let me do as I liked, and at last when she drew it back she was astonished to find it wanted wiping.

‘What is that?’

‘The most pleasant of substances, which renovates the world.’ (*Memoirs* 123)

The above encounter came about when he and Mademoiselle de la Meure were discussing the length of his phallus in relation to that of his friend who was nicknamed Count Sixtimes after his sexual escapade with Madame Lambertini. This nickname was bestowed on his friend because he achieved in one night what it often takes six weeks for a husband to do (11). This encounter had ‘humbled’ him as he then realized Count Sixtimes was two inches taller than him in phallic length. It was at the girl's confusion of how tallness can intimidate one that Casanova gathered her hand onto his penis and ejaculated into it. This seminal fluid Lovric creatively terms ‘the procreative word’ (*Carnevale* 25). He likens his own semen to the ‘word of God’ in Lovric's novel. The word of God created the world in seven days and his (Casanova's) word will procreate, telling the womb how to go about its duties. This is the kind of power attributed to bodily substance. As he understands semen being able to renovate the world, we will notice that he fashions his own world with the idea that the body holds some spiritual, intellectual value, beyond that of the purely corporeal:

In the Judeo-Christian tradition, the presence of "sexually explicit" or "graphic" material always requires a justification. Of course, there is little agreement about *what* these terms cover, and even less agreement on the theoretical question of how (or whether) sexuality can be represented. (Caplan 2, my emphasis)

A 'what' arises here: what are the terms of justification for sexually explicit material? For Casanova, this justification is irrelevant, because he rather gives an explanation as to why the body expresses itself so boldly. Casanova sanctifies his sexuality and describes it as 'sacrifice' and 'mortification'. Addiction to pleasure, to novelty, to the self is what Venetian culture implied in the days of Casanova. In a strangely biblical way, he offers up his body as a pleasing sacrifice to women, and it is much like a physical proclamation of 'This is my body [...] and may it be pleasing in thy sight.' He delves into the dialectic of nature versus duty to explicate the impossibility of a 'regular' lifestyle, which included being a clergyman.

As aforementioned, the issue of feasting is an integral part of the Casanovian philosophy surfacing in Casanova's *Memoirs*. Much like the Christian idea of the sacrificial lamb, sharing his body as a symbol of eternal life for mankind, Casanova tries to impersonate spiritual heroism by giving up his body for sacrificial pleasure, initiating his own religion: Casanovism. Caplan echoes my sentiments when he explains that:

The Story of My Life, a private story which nobody else knows, is worth more than a story like Augustine's Confessions, which retells what everyone should already know about the nature of human desire. [...] In autobiography as in the novel, "This is my body" loses its semiotically exemplary value," and becomes the watch- word of countless narratives which seek to communicate the infinitely rich, complex world of individual experience. However, if "This is my body" is no longer interpreted in terms of transubstantiation, as if a body were actually present in the story, then these narratives (autobiographies, novels) must be understood as presenting facsimiles or fictions [...] of individual experience. If the truth of experience, like the Protestant God, can only be known to a solitary individual, then that experience can only be known to others vicariously, in a generally-recognizable, symbolic form. It can only be known in the generalizable or general form, which communicates the truth of individual experience to everyone. When individual experience becomes inherently

more valuable than exemplary experience, it becomes necessary to translate that experience into universally meaningful signs of value, into a common language, which is that of vicarious experience [...] (12-13)

What Casanova is saying with the presentation of his body in a recognizably autobiographical literary work, is that personal experience has value in the mere exchange of bodies. In this lies the beauty and decorum of the common language of the body. Caplan alerts us to the fact that vicarious experience is attributed to the universally significant set of signs. One can extend this idea by referring to Casanova himself, as his own philosophy seems to serve as a theoretical home ground for his own conclusions concerning the abovementioned ideas. He explains his reasoning: “This was my way. Whenever I obeyed a spontaneous impulse, whenever I did anything of a sudden, I thought I was following the laws of my destiny, and yielding to a supreme will.” (*Memoirs* 377)

He is governed by sensual impulse, and the fact that he attributes spiritual supremacy to the pleasures of the flesh exhibits the notion that the corporeal inherently possesses supremacy of its own and need not be subjacent to the rational operations of the mind. In fact, that these impulses are naturally occurring, confirms the fact that it is Nature itself who passes them down to humans for their gratification through sacrificial pleasure. Casanova gives up his body for the consumption of an ever encroaching desire. As I pointed out earlier, Caplan understands that graphic material needed justification. Casanova notes:

[He] had not those feelings which justify the faults committed by the senses, nor that probity which serves as a contrast to the follies and frailties of man. Divine theology rises above all fleshly considerations, and after what we had heard we had either to allow this privilege, or to consider the young theologian as a woman without shame. (555)

Here, Casanova provides a theological justification of faults which he equates to the senses. In turn, these frailties are equated to *human* nature. However, he goes on to describe these frailties as mere fleshly considerations which offer us a

privilege. Casanova makes a clear distinction between duty and nature. He commits his body to the profession of ‘lovemaking’, a duty in itself which is (in accordance with Venetian ideology): to show the world every beautiful part of himself. To him, Nature had the upper hand in the way he put his body to use; he mentions in his *Memoirs* that ‘[n]ature had wants which *must* be administered to.’ Again we see a type of urgency with which he speaks and he does so in the light of knowing that his efforts to gain appraisal for his clerical duties were overshadowed and penetrated by his erotic appeal.

Casanova creates a law to support his own ideas. If Nature had wants which ‘must be administered to’, then he had no choice but to commit his ways to the fulfillment of that law. In his attempt at being a clergyman, his first sermon produced a collection box full of love letters. In some ways, I feel like Casanova interpreted this as a divine sign for departing from his work as a clergyman and following his destiny chosen by Nature herself, as he would have it. He says: “[W]hatever man does is done for his own interest, does it follow that gratitude is a folly, and virtue and vice identical?” (280). He equalizes the debate of assigning moralistic value to virtue by asserting that, he “saw nothing novel in [...] the position that morality is dependent on the reason [for deciding against sexual indulgence]” (279). He employs reconciliation between vice and virtue by marrying them to man’s need to serve his own interests, whether to appear honourable or to revel in his flesh. He also writes: “[L]ove always makes men selfish, since all the sacrifices they make for the beloved object are always ultimately referable to their own desires” (609). The concept of love here is used as a virtuous trait. Casanova uses the term ‘love’ interchangeably, again indicating his desire to reconcile the ideas of vice and virtue. He seems to be grappling with the idea of the moralistic treatment of love. For Casanova, love indicates not only the expression of the pleasures of the body, but it also significantly indicates the presence of emotional affection. He often considers himself in love with a woman whom he ultimately wants to seduce, not distinguishing between lust and love. He speaks of Madame Zeroli as being more desirable in bed than at the table. Feasting and fighting are characteristic of Casanova’s approach to sexual interaction.

I helped her to put on her stays, and the sight of her charms inflamed my

ardour, but I experienced more resistance than I had anticipated. I sat down at the foot of her bed, and told her how fervently I loved her, and how unhappy I was at not being able to give her marks of my love before I left. (596)

That which is expressed through words and emotions, must be consummated through the physical. For love to be noticed and manifested there should be markers upon the object. Lovric, too, understands how Casanova operates in relation to this idea and so makes room for it in her fictional writing. For Cecilia Cornaro in *Carnevale*, the literary Casanova also left marks on her body, scars of war equated to signs of love:

By the afternoon, when I returned home and to my mirror, my naked body had started to change again. Some slight bruising was marking my thighs. And my chin flaked, revealing tender shiny skin underneath; Casanova's kisses, his saliva, the rasp of his cheeks, the buffeting of his hips, had marked me after all. (*Carnevale* 29)

Casanova commits himself to lovemaking as one would commit oneself to a cause. Lovric writes, he was 'human lusts written larger than life' (20). Casanova seems to mark his lovers with the signs that he has been there. He marks them however, as a means of spreading his love for humanity, and not as a means to appear territorial. In his critical conversation with Monsieur Voltaire, he mentions that:

Your passion is the love of humanity. Estubipeccas. This blinds you. Love humanity, but love it as it is. It is not fit to receive the blessings you would lavish on it, and which would only make it more wretched and perverse. Leave men their devouring monster, it is dear to them. (583)

Casanova explains the types of passion involved in loving humanity. Firstly, he explains that Voltaire is blinded by his passionate love for humanity, blinded because of the expectations and requirements he holds before recognizing the true state thereof. For Casanova, what aggrieves Voltaire is his idealization of humanity. The only way to truly love humanity is to retire his belief that it is far superior to its devouring monster.

In his manuscripts obtained from the library at Dux under the observation of Arthur Symonds, Casanova writes: “Truth is the only God I have ever adored” (“Introduction” 17). Therefore, it is safe to state that for Casanova, the truth of humanity is its impassioned nature. The only way to contend with it is to love it and make love to it in its truest form. Humanity then, will not further contort to a more wretched and perverse state than that it is already in. Casanova assumes this position: to love humanity, in a way that compels him to be its lover. He so lavishes his blessing of lovemaking upon it.

This monstrous passion overcomes him in almost every situation and he seems to understand that this is humanity in its truest form. He therefore never simulates moral authority over this monster, but rather engages in battle with it, where its defeat echoes the throes of orgasmic ecstasy. Casanova asserts: “You fear some disastrous consequences from which you cannot escape, your heart and mind are at war, and there is a struggle in your breast between passion and sentiment” (478). For Voltaire this may have been a concern, the concern of consequence. Casanova speaks to that concern, that fear of disaster striking after mindless impassioned action is practised. At the apex of sentiment and passion is fear, its eradication is therefore key to living in harmony with nature. Paradoxically, that harmony is found by entering into war of symbiotic exchange from one body to another. The only scars are those of lovemaking and the only defeat found in the orgasm. This is what lies at the base of Casanova’s belief that man’s desire is ultimately to fulfill himself, and whichever route he takes is irrelevant. What he proposes to Voltaire, but also to his reader, is that the routes do not need to be conflicting and that at some point they inevitably converge. Vice and virtue are equal attributes which lead to the satisfaction of the same innate human desire. Casanova suggests placing the two on an equal playing field and living in relation to mankind treating love and lust as equal entities making up one unified whole.

Casanova, to my mind, develops a type of religious code by which he lives, much like his autobiographical *Memoirs* written to himself, and for his own pleasure. There are moments in which he interacts with divine concepts, further justifying my observations about religious conduct in Casanova’s epicurean lifestyle:

She uncovered her bosom, not thinking it would give me any pleasure, but wishing to be polite, without supposing I had any concealed desires. I passed my hands over two spheres whose perfect shape and whiteness would have restored Lazarus to life. (619)

By associating the woman we know only as M.M. with possessing supernatural powers in her bosom, he suggests that the body in itself possesses miraculous energies which can effect in unfathomable results. His understanding that aesthetic perfection is supernaturally powerful, confirms the notion that for Casanova, there exists no distinction between the intelligence of the mind and the body. He even places intellectual prowess beneath the force of bodily mysticism. The sacred thus becomes a prominent feature of what I now coin Casanovism. Casanova legitimizes his interaction with the flesh on the basis of his sacred treatment of the female body, describing the vaginal opening as ‘the temple of love’ and using a sofa as ‘an altar of sacrifice’ for consummating a physical experience (467). All these sacred allusions divulge once again the inconsistency of the idea that the mind is the body’s superior. In his relations with what is known as his ‘epicurean syndic’, Casanova shares some co-relational behavioural patterns (570). They indulge in delicious orgies with the three Graces and share some of their most profound ideas about their distinctive, resonating lifestyles. The syndic professes: “Unfortunately, that is no merit as far as I am concerned. I was born for the service of love, and Venus has punished me for worshipping her when I was too young” (572). Here Casanova seems to have found a like-minded person, dedicated to the worship of Venus, the worship of corporeal love. Even though the syndic seems to have reluctantly relinquished his control over his sexual appetite to Venus, he too treats this service to womankind as a supernatural calling, one from which he cannot escape. Casanova counter-intuitively prescribes that this service to women be deemed a duty instead of an unfortunate, guilty practice.

In his 1970 lectures on *Sex and Sexuality* Michel Foucault notes that:

[There exists a] multiplicity of bodily forces that break through the surface of the body to disrupt the regulating practices of cultural coherence imposed upon that body by a power regime, understood as a vicissitude of “history”. If the presumption of some kind of precategorical source of disruption is refused, is it still possible to give genealogical account of the demarcation of the body as such as a signifying practice? [...]. This signifying practice effects a social space for and of the body within certain regulatory grids of intelligibility. (178)

It is exactly this intelligibility that propels my next argument: Is it because of the lack of intelligible signs, unfathomable to the mind, that there is a restriction on graphic representations of the body? The signifying practice here would then be those which disrupt common cultural ones. For Casanova, that would be renouncing the indulgence of the flesh. It seems to be the lack of understanding the body’s intelligence and its language, which leads a culture to prescribing normative practices as the only acceptable means of bodily expressions; those which take place within the confines of designated contexts which have been generated to be ‘imposed upon the body by a power regime’. However, I deduce that the body has an intelligence of its own. Even Lovric describes her Casanova’s phallus as a genius organ belonging to a genius lover. Yet, even for Casanova, these cultural inscriptions defying the spoken word of the body had to be given a place in his system of thought. He had taken to placing himself on provisional probation to test the presence of so-called natural goodness within his own character. Prior to his resignation to a life of virtue which he felt would be made manifest in abstaining from sensual practices, he found that:

[He] narrated scandalous histories unnumerable, which, however, [he] told simply and not spicily, since [he] felt ascetically disposed and obliged [himself] to speak with a contrition [he] did not feel, for when [he] recounted [his] follies [he] was very far from finding the remembrance of them disagreeable. (402)

Aligning himself with the habits he assumed in relation to his proposed ascetic lifestyle, even in his sincerest attempts at appearing repentant, he simply could not conjure up the regret or remorse to make his confession sincere. Although he divulged immeasurable amounts of information of his voluptuous scandals, he did not regret them. It is as if his proclamations were suffused with inherent decadence.

Casanova's his attempt at absolving his fallible record is submersed in a history bent on pursuing a life of decadence. Because of this overtly recognizable decadence, he is thus involuntarily absolved. He need not resign his soul to the responsibility of adhering to a life of so-called goodness by virtue of this realization. Judith Butler in *Gender Trouble* discusses the concept that:

‘Nothing in man [sic] - not even his body - is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding other men’ [sic]. The constancy of cultural inscription as a ‘single drama’ acts on the body. If the creation of values, that historical mode of signification, requires the destruction of the body [...], then there must be a body prior to that inscription, stable and self-identical, subject to that sacrificial destruction. (15)

What Butler is describing here, is exactly that ‘what’ I raised earlier in this discussion. What is the significance of a value system in the presence of a body which has been stabilized only to be sacrificed? In this sentence, the idea functions as a fattening of the calf before slaughter. The cultural value system here prescribes a set of beliefs imposed upon the body as a way of amplifying or fattening its presence by superimposition. What is clear is that the more arresting a cultural belief, the more visible the body. It is in this way that the body becomes impossible to ignore by way of the very system trying to veil its sensual presence. Casanova describes his experience of living a different type of good life which essentially nullifies him:

But to my own greates astonishment I was a mirror of discretion, and in four days that was my character all over the town. I was quite astonished to find myself accosted in quite a respectful manner, to which I was not accustomed; but in the pious state of mind I was in, this confirmed me in the belief that my

idea of taking the cowl had been a Divine inspiration. Nevertheless, I felt listless and weary, but I looked upon that as the inevitable consequence of so complete a change of life, and thought it would disappear when I grew more accustomed to goodness. (406)

Casanova in a rather careful manner had taken to renovating his lifestyle. He attributes this renewed lifestyle to a state of mind. Although he felt ‘listless and weary’ he treated these symptoms as the excessive outpouring of the revolutionary degree of this lifestyle change. Interestingly enough, these unaccustomed habits of his new life should be approached through thorough thoughtfulness as opposed to his previous life of thoughtlessness and recklessness. Engulfed in this pious state of mind Casanova’s earlier contact with a priest reveals his innermost belief concerning the notion of piety: “The priest was an eloquent man, although a theologian, who answered the most difficult religious questions I could put to him. There is no mystery with him, everything was reason” (552). Piety for Casanova seems to be affected by reason. It is with this attitude then that he decides to concretize a reasonable life which does not seem to yield the same results as it did for the theologian. For Casanova, mystery is what held the seduction of his previous vices in this case, and to become acclimatized to his new lifestyle, it is this very seduction of which he must dispose.

He says: “Reason and time quieted the tempest in [his] heart” (552). Reason is seen to have a sedative effect on him. It is almost as if one needed to be completely numbed or barely conscious in order to forget the delicacies proposed by a delectable stance to sexuality. In so doing, reason would have put to sleep the voraciousness of his sensual life. This numbing effect of reason could have been the premise of Lovric’s research on the religious observation of Lent in 18th century Venetian culture. She surmises that:

The flesh which the Venetians were about to renounce was not just veal or pork, it was also the soft skin that covered them. It was that flesh, through which they experienced sunlight, the kisses of their lovers, the taste of wine, which it grieved them so much to lose that they indulged in a wild orgy of happiness to light up the grief which was shortly to follow. Perhaps they hoped

to have loved, eaten, drunk so much to be barely conscious during Lent.
(*Carnevale Notes* 2)

As her research shows, the festival preceding the period of Lent, consummates the orgiastic indulgence in the flesh. In much the same manner, Casanova seems to want to put to rest his body's agitation before he had resigned to becoming a monk:

I waited till noon with the impatience of a child who has been promised toys on his birthday- so completely and suddenly can an infatuation change one's nature. I saw three or four ladies who pleased me, and whose eyes wandered a good deal in my direction. I should have liked to make love to them, to make the best of my time before I became a monk. (*Memoirs* 405)

This striving towards unconsciousness during a life devoted to religious austerity is seen to be the only way to survive this lifestyle. The feeling of pleasure should be completely ostracized; the root of self-indulgence should be uprooted by inducing the very thing of which it tries to rid the flesh. Casanova however recants: "There are monsters who preach repentance, and philosophers who treat all pleasures as vanity. Let them talk on. Repentance only befits crimes, and pleasures are realities, though all too fleeting" (413). Casanova expresses a tormented tone, postulating that those who preach repentance are monsters: monsters who try to tease out the establishment of a decadent reality, present in the flesh. He then likens the pleasures of the body to reality, as if he is coming to terms with the distinction between punishment for criminal activity and being judged for being too passionate. Casanova, an extremist of note, would push to its limitations both the expressions of pleasure and austerity. However, he seems to be wrestling with himself, torn between these conflicting ideas which he always tries to conjoin.

...

2.3 OF FIRES AND FORM

Casanova, an idealist and bohemian of his time, affirmed his appetites by the aspiration to be a free thinker and in so doing, he inadvertently develops a

hypothesis on beauty. It is necessary to observe closely what Casanova implies when he speaks of this attribute:

The Beautiful, as I have been told, is endowed with this power of attraction; and I would fain believe it, since that which attracts me is necessarily beautiful in my eyes, but is it so in reality? I doubt it, as that which has influenced me has not influenced others. The universal or perfect beauty does not exist, or it does not possess this power. All who have discussed the subject have hesitated to pronounce upon it, which they would not have done if they had kept to the idea of *form*. (544, emphasis in original).

Casanova here grapples with the mimetic representation of his own ideas of what beauty is. He assumes that his attractions by default define his definition of beauty. However, he soon mentions that that which is beautiful can only be experienced subjectively; hence he says “what has influenced me has not influenced others”. Casanova understands that the subjectivity of the individual’s attention to what is beautiful deviates from the universal conditions of the same concept. Casanova then, unifies the divergent ideas by tying it to one aspect: form; for him:

Beauty is only form, for that which is not beautiful is that which has no form, and the deformed is the opposite of the *pulchrum* and *formosum*. [...] If the word *forma* is Latin, we should seek for the Latin meaning and not the French, which, however, often uses *deforme* or *difforme* instead of *laid*, ugly, without people’s noticing that its opposite should be a word which implies the existence of form; and this could only be *beauty*. We should note that *informe* in French as well as in Latin means *shapeless*, a body without any definite appearance. (544, emphasis in original)

Casanova vehemently insists that there is no beauty without form and the resistance to define something as ‘deformed’ already indicates the absence of beauty. Beauty without form is non-existent. This implies that the beauty of the body, specifically, underscores the fleeting power of attraction. If beauty exists in the formation of a body, then it would seem as though the power of attraction can be contained. The fear that beauty will inevitably fade is made manifest in the

struggle to articulate what beauty is, in shape and form. He finally concedes, after extensive deliberation:

We will conclude, then, that it is the beauty of woman which has always exercised an irresistible sway over me, and more especially that beauty which resides in the face. It is there the power lies, and so true is that, that the sphinxes of Rome and Versailles almost make me fall in love with them, though, the face excepted, they are deformed in every sense of the word. In looking at the fine proportions of their faces one forgets their deformed bodies. What, then, is beauty? We know not; and when we attempt to define it or to enumerate its qualities we become like Socrates, we hesitate. The only thing that our minds can seize is the effect produced by it, and that which charms, ravishes, and makes me in love, I call beauty. (544)

He divulges his own hesitation in concretizing his own findings concerning beauty. There exists fluidity in the way in which he grasps his perception of form. He takes this idea and then further ascribes it to a very specific position on the body: the face. The form held in the face, he suggests, takes precedence or even maybe authority over the shape of the body. Ultimately, he argues for himself, that the effect of the formation of the face enforces the attraction he feels to the entire body. Pleasure and self-expression are then the effects Casanova describes. The force of attraction to the body as this vehicle of self-expression then redefines how hedonism commutes within the corporeal space. The issue of pleasure operating within the corporeal space suggests, firstly, a containment of pleasure, and secondly the application of mystical qualities to the body. Caplan touches on this:

In any case, the typical justification takes the form of an appeal to a "higher" value (higher, that is, than the doubly guilty pleasure of sexual representation): truth (realism), beauty, or morality. ("Vicarious Jouissances" 2, parenthesis in original)

Mike Featherstone who writes on the presence of the body within consumer culture delineates the body as the canvas upon which it self-preserved and hides its deterioration (15). How do these two ideas converge in Casanova's treatment of

the beauty of the body being the site of fiery attraction, attraction giving way eventually, to burning desire?

Casanova's interaction with a dame called Murphy (O-Morphi), who is accustomed to sleeping naked, expels his overreaction to his own attractions to this beauty. Casanova epitomizes the ideal beauty as that which is of Greek origin, like Venus. After dinner with his friend and Miss Murphy he seeks a bed on which to sleep, which he finds is not to his liking and becomes curt with her. However, after discovering this habit of hers, he is immediately drawn to her as a spectacle of beauty. Caplan states that "Casanova begs the reader to concede that purely esthetic admiration would hardly have constituted an adequate response to such a spectacle" (4). Here Casanova asserts symbolic value to supersede the sole admiration of her form. He thus justifies the propensity to act upon his attraction.

Furthermore, in order to justify our own interaction with Casanova's ideas on beauty, we must observe the way in which he expresses the idea of desire. The reactive state of the body expresses itself through festered arousal. It is therefore synonymous with a chemical reaction, spurting off in manifestations of elemental qualities. For Casanova, the predominant element associated with desire is fire. When ravishing Mademoiselle de la Meure, the convent girl, we see an insurgence of this reactive essence, bound within his body: "My hand began to press the bosom of her dress, where were imprisoned, two spheres which seemed to lament their captivity. I went farther, I began to untie strings... for where does desire stop short?" (41). The term 'farther' reveals the unbridled nature of desire and its inclination to break forth. He describes her breasts as lamenting its captivity and it being imprisoned by its confinement. He renders himself a liberator of both his own erotic suppressions but also those of the women he engages. He shows that desire cannot be halted and that it has be poured forth in deluge in order to do justice to the attraction which spawned its origins in the flesh. In his elaboration on how the chemistry between him and the convent girl functions, he describes the dichotomy between feminine and masculine bodies:

The flame of my love lit another in her [...] and forgetting her former self she opened her arms to me, making me promise not to despise her, and

what would one not promise! The modesty inherent in the sex, the fear of results, perhaps a kind of instinct which reveals to them the natural faithlessness of men make women ask for such promises, but what mistress, if really amorous, would e'en think of asking her lover to respect her in her moment of delirious ecstasy, when all one's being is centred on the fulfillment of desire? (41-2)

This heat, this flame, is of such potency, that even at the height of this corporeal exchange, such promises as expressed above, are not far from a man's lips. He describes a woman's arousal as delirious ecstasy, which cannot be considered when the need for effecting penetration comes into question. Therefore, desire is of the nature that nullifies distinctive habits of men and women when it comes to its fulfillment. The burgeoning heat of desire produces a delirium which overcomes both bodies so as to nullify even the respective sexes' common cultural habits.

Casanova further narrates:

After we had passed an hour in these amorous toyings, which set my sweetheart on fire, her charms having never before been exposed to the burning lips or the free caresses of a man [...] She got up in all her naked charms, and as she put a stick to the fire the flame leapt up; I rose, I found her standing so as to display all their beauties, and I could refrain no longer, I pressed her to my heart, she returned my caresses, and till day-break we gave ourselves to an ecstasy of pleasure. We had spent four or five delicious hours on the sofa. (42)

Casanova explains that they gave themselves to pleasure. This indicates that there is a self to be given but Casanova is distinct in displaying that this self has to be steadily approached as it is being governed by the sensations of ecstatic pleasure. He speaks of their bodies as active objects without control. Featherstone explicates that:

The outer body refers to appearance as well as movement and control of the body within social space [...]. For our purposes, it is the appearance and management of impressions of the outer body that are of particular interest [...]. [T]he inner and the outer body become conjoined: the prime purpose

of the maintenance of the inner body becomes the enhancement of the appearance of the outer body. (2)

Casanova fashions his body on the basis of this sentiment here. In a way that expresses his primal need for pleasure in this regard, he resists what is held so tightly in the body. The self that is given over to the activities of pleasure becomes the reflective glass which shows the impressions of the outer body. In other words, Casanova maintains his erotic capital so that he is always relevant and pleasing to women:

We complain of women who, though loving us and sure of our love, refuse us their favours; but we are wrong in doing so, for if they love they have good reason to fear lest they lose us in the moment of satisfying our desires. Naturally they should do all in their power to retain our hearts, and the best way to do so is to cherish our desire of possessing them; but desire, is only kept alive by being denied enjoyment kills it, since one cannot desire what one has got. I am, therefore, of opinion that women are quite right to refuse us. But if it be granted that the passions of the two sexes are of equal strength, how comes it that a man never refuses to gratify a woman who loves him and entreats him to be kind? (46)

Possession and power of control play a significant role in the way Casanova explains to us the habits of the two sexes. However, I would like to focus more intimately on the idea that desire is best preserved through its denial. Issues of restraint come to the fore and for us to reach appropriate conclusions concerning Casanova's teachings on desire, we must note the fact that he relates possession to love. We already discussed the idea that Casanova thinks of love as physical. What is more is that he extends this view to encompass a consumption of the senses. He places desire at the apex of the most tangible form of love. He contrasts beauty and its effects to something more grotesque and violent. This is why we can associate his logic of attributing the element of fire to desire, as a natural indication of that which is uncontrollable, something which completely overtakes and consumes.

Casanova's sexual engagement with a certain Mdlle X.C.V, creates the landscape for the way in which he defines the ridges of passion. He writes:

[I]t is no wonder if the hidden fire threatened at every moment to leap up from the ashes of its concealment, her image pursued me unceasingly, of her I always thought, and every day made it more evident that I should know rest no more till I succeeded in extinguishing my passion by obtaining possession of all her charms. (100-1)

Whilst trying to uphold the outward appearance of decorum, his suppression of this fire continued only to grow in its magnitude. He comically explains:

[S]he [the charming Englishwoman: Mdlle. X.C.V] complimented me upon my strength of mind in subduing my passion, adding, with a smile, that my desire could not have pricked me very sharply, seeing that I had cured myself so well in the course of a week. I quietly replied that I owed my cure not to the weakness of my passion but to my self-respect. (194)

For Casanova, the mind is something to be built as it has the ability to be strengthened and sharpened. Maybe for Casanova the muscle of the mind is used to oppose the effects of passion: their manifestations can be tamed by the strength of the mind. However, there always exists an established friction between the form of the body and the passions which lurk beneath, as is clearly expressed by his interaction with a girl called Esther: "[W]e were tormented by abstinence, which irritated while it increased our desires" (163). So, there is this constant interplay between the passions and desires and their subjugation. Why would such friction be necessary or even present in a hedonist devoted to pleasure? Read what he says about reason:

My state of mind may be judged from the fact that I determined to kill my rival. The most savage plans, the most cruel designs, ran race through my bewildered brain. I was jealous, in love, a different being from my ordinary self; anger, vanity, and shame had my powers of reasoning. (57)

This follows news concerning the convent girl said to marry a man from Dunkirk. Enraged with jealousy fuelled by passion he adopts the powers of reasoning. Casanova makes it seem as if reason is a spell which comes upon you and is subject to the ordinances of events surrounding a test of how strong your mind is. This is a strangely interesting concept. It suggests that within the confines of the self, lies a body which invokes a higher order of reasoning. He even concludes that “strong passion and prejudice cannot reason” (106). Casanova felt himself being separate to his ordinary self when filled with passionate rage for both his beloved and his rival. Casanova says of his own desires that they are incurable, reason participates only as he seeks to defeat his rival. What defines Casanova’s passion as always actively seeking an outlet is that:

It [has] power to generate forms of “outward show”, brilliant designs, glamorous spectacles, so dazzling that they can blind even the most incisive self to the radiance of its own darker life within. (Berman 50)

This darker drive manifests even in Casanova’s conceptualization of attaining his object of beauty. He speaks of his conquests as follows:

A girl who is pretty and good, and as virtuous as you please, ought not to take it ill that a man, carried away by her charms, should set himself to the task of making their conquest. If this man cannot please her by any means, even if his passion be criminal, she ought never to take offence at it, nor treat him unkindly; she ought to be gentle, and pity him, if she does not love him, and think it enough to keep invincibly hold upon her own duty. (qtd in Symons 3)

He equates passion in its proliferating degrees as criminal and excuses himself on the basis of treating the object of desire, as prescribed to pity him. His dalliance with Esther proved to show that he considered the force of desire to be unlawful: “[T]he kisses I was so happy to snatch from you at the ball have inflamed my blood, and if you have not enough kindness to cure me in the only possible way I shall leave Cologne with a life-long grief” (354).

Passion is inflammatory and a physical condition which being satisfied, is said to be cured: sexual intercourse is then anti-inflammatory; and the two fit into each

other. Casanova feels that his passions are incurable; if a woman's form is agreeable it is likely that she will arouse those violent attractions within him. However, he does mention that there exists a cure for the passions, albeit a very simple one: age. In his "Preface" he states:

It may be that certain love scenes will be considered too explicit, but let no one blame me, unless it be for lack of skill, for I ought not to be scolded because, in my old age, I can find no other enjoyment but that which recollections of the past afford to me. After all, virtuous and prudish readers are at liberty to skip over any offensive pictures. (27)

Age blunts the jagged edge of illicit images or scenes. In the guise of a faded memory, he still wishes to indulge in the voluptuous appearance of his lived experience, his lived passion. It is not the dying out of the passion that is brought on by old age, but rather the ability to make oneself agreeable to others. The sorrow felt in acknowledging this makes Casanova unapologetic and tragic:

I was told that in his youth he was a lover of the fair sex, but now that he was no longer good for anything he had modestly made himself into a woman, and had four pretty pets in his employ, who took turns in the disgusting duty of warming his old carcase at night. (568)

Here Casanova refers to Villars, the governor of Provence, where he was visiting. He speaks disdainfully of his body, which had been emaciated by age and disease. He even says that Villars should have been buried ten years ago. Casanova's treatment of the aging body reveals his deeply held notion of the body being subject to decay. Casanova seems to be saying that with age, the body loses shape, its beauty, everything shrivels and deteriorates. Although sensual enjoyment in this period then cannot be practised through the skin, the faculties of memory, if sharp enough, are still able to relive these enjoyments.

Casanova immortalizes his experiences through his *Memoirs*, to paint them as truthfully and explicitly as he once lived them. To feel is to still be alive. Since the presence of passion is manifested so aggressively in youth, it is taken for granted that these are the signs of life, however, in old age one has to work harder to

prove that one is still alive, and still able to feel. Desire has to be more violent, sweeter, younger, and newer to solicit the strength once produced from a younger body with sharper senses.

This relationship between the powers of reasoning and intellect and the powers of passion and desire, form a counterpoint to how the body seeks out to immortalize itself. Ultimately, both have to govern the body through different cycles of apathy in order to speak. In youth, the verve of the body exposes the apathy of reasoning; in turn, apathy of sensuality in old age, exposes the verve of a memory fighting to recollect its sensuality. Casanova points out:

I have reached, in 1797, the age of three-score years and twelve; I cannot say [...] and I could not procure a more agreeable pastime than to relate my own adventures, and to cause pleasant laughter amongst the good company listening to me, from which I have received so many tokens of friendship, and in the midst of which I have ever lived. (“Author’s Preface” 22)

Casanova finds it imperative to recount his adventures as a projection of his own indulgence. By living through and beyond his own *Memoirs*, he wishes, almost by default, that those who read them are experiencing them in the same vivacity that he does as he writes them, but more importantly as he had lived them. He understands that “reason only comes to the aid of the mind when the confusion produced by painful thoughts has almost vanished” (469).

Casanova also touches on a very important aspect of aging. He understands that there is a certain tragedy within remembering and reliving through memory as these passions can no longer be felt or produced by the body. The disfigurement of the body lends itself to a warped construct of time and hence, it decays; leaving only the desperation of the memory to preserve the story of the body. He explains: “By recollecting the pleasures I have had formerly, I renew them, I enjoy them a second time, while I laugh at the remembrance of troubles now past, and which I no longer feel” (“Author’s Preface” 22). He celebrates both the loss of troubles and the renewal of the pleasures manifested in writing. The issue of feeling is strongly emphasized and is one I believe forms the foundation of the entire

interaction of desire and beauty and their withering. He issues the sentiment as follows:

I know that I have lived because I have felt, and, feeling giving me the knowledge of my existence, I know likewise that I shall exist no more when I shall have ceased to feel. (“Author’s Preface” 22)

Beauty passes in form with age, as well as passion. It is the reduction of feeling which forces the body either to pursue stronger passions, or to relinquish any contact with it and redress it within writing. Eventually, it is a war between mortality and immortality: “Should I perchance still feel after my death, I would no longer have any doubt, but I would most certainly give the lie to anyone asserting before me that I was dead” (“Author’s Preface” 22). This is an addictive ritual; one which surmounts the concept of death. He claims that that which cannot be felt is not real; therefore, it is only through feeling that one is made alive. Feeling is a testament to life and being alive. Memory then has the ability to allow this feeling to generate under a different pretext, that of impression:

The mind of a human being is formed only of comparisons made in order to examine analogies, and therefore cannot precede the existence of memory [...]. [I]t is then that my soul began to be susceptible of receiving impressions. How is it possible for an immaterial substance, which can neither touch nor be touched to receive impressions? It is a mystery which man cannot unravel. (“Author’s Preface” 22)

As with beauty, impression forgoes logic and reason. It is what is done to the body without the rationalizing of why it is so. Casanova had said that if he considers something to be beautiful, it does not in turn confirm its generic beauty. There is no quantifying measure of reality that can be forced into an individual perception. In spite of this, impressions are free reactions, unbound by the interpretations of logic. For that reason, beauty and passion are grounded in the impulse that we are subjected to how they impress upon us. As a materialist, Casanova employs sentimental readings on the issue of the soul. Yet, he holds that the soul is made material through the skin, through the manifestation of passion and beauty. He ruminates: “I have known several persons [...] who in a fit of passion used to feel

his soul escaping by every pore” (58). Passion expels the soul from the body. The body is treated and mistreated as the host of the sublime yet unordered outpourings of passion, desire, emotionality, etc. To have this 'fit of passion' one needs the state of the body to be vested in the strongest rages so that it is able to force out the soul through the skin.

...

Chapter 3

The Adventures of Ferdinand Count Fathom - Tobias E. Smollett

3.1 INSURGENCE BREEDS WHERE PASSION PRECEDES

*Then, if Blood impetuous swells the Veins,
And the choler in the Constitution reigns,
Outrageous Fury straight inflames the Soul*
(Thomas Fitzgerald "Bedlam". *Poems on Several Occasions*, 1733)

Through the myriad of philosophical thought concerning mind/body politics, the Kantian idea that: "[Freedom of will is that] property which enables us to originate events independently of foreign determining causes" that is the ability to "go by ourselves [without any want of anybody to push or pull us]" explains the body has a will of its own (Kant *Lectures and Essays* 79).

If the mind is a celebrated entity in the Age of Reason, surely it must be a faculty of the greatest abilities. Does the freedom of will reside in the mind? The will is often thought of as the capacity to dictate the sensations, to subdue the passions and subjugate the body. So, freedom of will is the opportunity to order the will into those directions most desirable to us, virtuous or vicious. If man is *willing*, the body functions accordingly. The nineteenth century philosopher and mathematician, William Clifford in his *Lectures and Essays* suggests that, man goes by himself, in other words: we go by that self, which is determined by the will's navigation (67).

Through the control of the body's will, the ability to abstain from certain vices and perform certain virtuous duties is formed. Through the successes and failures of these, character is formed. William Clifford clarifies the fundamentals of character:

[W]hat is meant by the character of a person? You judge a person's character by what he thinks and does under certain circumstances. Let us see what determines this. We can only be speaking here of voluntary actions- those actions in which the person is consulted, and which are not done by his body without his leave (48)

In this light, we can assume that the will impacts the actions, yet whichever *kind* of will controls the actions; those *kinds* of actions will manifest. Hence, character is a set of voluntary actions manifested in involuntary circumstances; therefore it is impossible for an action to be performed if it is not ignited by a fit of passion. Whatever action is performed is that which has been latent within someone's character. We therefore cannot say that such and such a personality is bound to be formed due to the circumstance; but rather that an action is a result of the circumstance impacting on such and such a character. Therefore, Smollett shows that Ferdinand by virtue of living with his own malice, learns how to distinguish between the virtue and vice of his own character. Clifford further expounds that:

In those voluntary actions what takes place is that a certain sensation is communicated to the mind, the sensation is manipulation by the mind, and conclusions are drawn from it, and then the emotions are sent out which causes certain motions to take place. The character of the person is evidently determined by the nature of this manipulation. If the sensation suggests a wrong thing, the character of the person will be bad (*Lectures and Essays* 48)

Smollett has a way of characterizing passion through the human qualities he bestows on it and likewise through the animalistic qualities he bestows on humans. What could he be suggesting about the qualities of passion? To sieve out the hints Smollett gives us, we must make sure we understand him correctly through the narrative voice in the novel:

He had formerly imagined but was now fully persuaded, that the sons of men preyed upon one another, and such was the end and condition of their being. Among the principle figures of life, he observed few or no characters that did not bear an analogy to the savage tyrants of the wood. One resembled a tyger in fury and rapaciousness; a second prowled about like a hungry wolf, seeking whom he might devour; a third acted a part of a jackall, in the beating bush for game to his voracious employer; and a fourth imitated a wily fox, in practising a thousand crafty ambuscades for the destruction of the ignorant and unwary (*Count Fathom* 23-4)

All the animals indicated in the above excerpt, have a sly and dangerous manner to which Ferdinand owed the functionality of the 'sons of men'. The insatiable lust in which Fathom is engulfed echoes the animalistic qualities of craftiness, avariciousness, rapacity, etc. What do the animal passions reveal about humanity? :

[P]assions are unequivocally corruptors of the rational and moral soul. The prevailing doctrine [of the 17th century] was that the passions arose from the sensitive soul, which humankind shares with animals, and that the uniquely human or reasonable soul, in which appetite for rationality and moral judgement are located, could only be contaminated through motion (Barbalet 179).

As a precursor to Enlightenment thought, we have this 17th century ideology which places the passions into the category of evil, the squanderer of mankind and posits authentic humanity as 'unique'. At base we share the same sensual qualities as that of animals. The appetitive faculty between humans and animals should then, according to Wright, be steered towards starkly oppositional standards: humans = reason vs. animals = sensuality. From this assumption, it is then understood that humans and animals are composed of distinctly different matter. William Clifford in his *Lectures and Essays* notes that:

It is very difficult indeed to suppose that the ordinary matter which makes a man's body can be conscious. This Me is quite different from the flesh and blood which make up a man, but then as to this other body, or soul, we do not know anything about it, so that it may as well be conscious or not (36)

The state of consciousness of the body is what determines from which order the passions function. If passions break loose through the medium of the material body then the passions are a material product. If we place emphasis on the passions as something foreign to the body then its functionality within and through the body will manifest as foreign as something to subdue, possess and lord over. John McAllister asserts that:

The more they [the passions] are restrained, the stronger they become and the more violently they finally break forth. This is why Ferdinand's passions

so often manifest themselves as violent physical disturbances (324)

Ferdinand, although comfortable with seduction, is incapable of composure once his passions overthrow him. Those 'violent physical disturbances' attack his prudence and he is defeated by their outbreak. The violence of passion gives it a territorial quality, and this violence fights for tenancy of its host, the subject, in our case, Ferdinand. If all Ferdinand's passions break forth in the physical, unfortunately that leaves no room for the superior prompting of reason to induce his actions. One particular instance in which Ferdinand is overcome by an outpouring of fiery desire is when he engages the maiden, Theresa:

He looked upon Theresa with the eyes of appetite, which he longed to gratify: for he was not at all dead to the instigations of the flesh, though he had philosophy enough to resist them, when he thought they interfered with his interest. Here the case was quite different: his desire happened to be upon the side of his advantage, and therefore, resolving to indulge it, he no sooner found himself in a condition to manage such an adventure, than he begun to make gradual advances in point of warmth and particular complacency to the love-sick maid. (*Count Fathom* 20)

Ferdinand loses his personality and his drives inhabit his being: he looks upon Theresa *with the eyes of appetite*. He seems to exchange human-like tendencies for those of a more animalistic nature in this description of his overwhelming passion. He forgoes the philosophy, apt to resist those 'instigations of the flesh', for a more adventurous indulgence of his desire. McAllister poignantly insists that:

[He manages] to disguise and manage his vicious drives during the long series of successful adventures, these drives- physical entities and hence "sensual motions of the appetitive faculty"- have a basic independence and cannot always be held in check by the will. In fact, the more they are restrained the more violently they finally break forth. (324)

If at base, sensual motions are independent, then that in itself suggests that passion takes precedence over the character and composure of the human subject. Passion pursues, instigates and prompts the violations brought about by desire. In

Smollett's novel, desire wishes, contemplates and schemes whereas passion pursues, delegates and subdues. The relationship between passion and reason serves to overwhelm the human subject.

Passion and reason play off against each other with equal vivacity and virtually the same methodology: both want to subdue, control and inhabit the host. Therefore, the rapacity of passion is observed in conjunction with the idea that no amount of philosophy can impart reason enough to reverse the actions of passion.

Carol Bynum's discussion about the socialization of the body's physical make up, highlights that the body is:

Seen in a slightly longer perspective, the antiessentialist position is, of course, a reaction to Cartesian and Enlightenment dichotomies; mind versus body, authority versus liberty, society (or nurture) versus nature, and so on. For all its energy and intelligence, it sometimes seems to flail in its analysis from one pole to the other- from performance to regulation, mind to matter, socialization to physical structure as if both were traps from which something (but what?) might escape (28, parenthesis in original)

I would like to pick up on Bynum's 'but what?': I find that it speaks of those very passions which lean neither on the mind nor body to regulate them; but create for themselves a space in which to flourish and from which they eventually break forth. They are neither here nor there but rather liminal. So it is exactly this bordering, this 'finding of balance' between external and internal that leaves the passions to spring forth and culminate into a volcanic mass of drives/actions as they reside on the imbalance of their supposed location. For Ferdinand this imbalance finds its inception in the preparation of the grounds upon which he would later dispose his gallantries. Ferdinand devises the strategy which clouds the judgements of his subjects/victims:

He therefore determined to fascinate the judgement, rather than the eyes of his fellow-creatures, by a continual exercise of that gift of deceiving, with which he knew himself endued to an unrivalled degree; and to acquire unbounded influence with those who might be subservient to his interest, by

an assiduous application to their prevailing passions (*Count Fathom* 24)

Since Ferdinand's plan involved deceiving his subjects, they needed to reason according to his strategy. In this way they become dependent upon him to sustain those interests. These interests of course mainly serve to Ferdinand's advantage. He leads them through the labyrinthine reformulation of sound judgement, winning them over so that they succumb to the infernal passions. Since Smollett writes describes the passions as prevailing, it is clear that those prevailing passions supersede the reasoning of man. It is therefore clear that Ferdinand treats the prevailing passions by showing that when given over to the passions which burgeon in every man's judgement, he is bound to become subservient to them. I however, concur with Barbalet's notion that "the relevance of the passions is not merely that they are forces to be controlled [...] but that they offer positive value in achieving purposes, no matter what those purposes must be" (180).

This must mean that passions are not irrelevant even in their detriment. As earlier mentioned Ferdinand uses them to procure his own interest and as a means towards his own advantageous end. Passions find their habitation in "the heart" but why then do they stir "up in every part of the body [?]" (Barbalet 33-4). Just as the properties of the mind lay dormant in the brain, so the passions lay dormant in the fibres of the body. They are then fuelled by the aggravation of the imbalance in their location. Barbalet observes that:

In [Wright's] treatment of the 'mortification' of the passions, their attention or management, indicates a number of measures that prefigure [...] discussion of emotions management. The purpose is not primarily to expel or suppress emotions, but to make them 'moderate' or 'appropriate' (180, quotations in original)

Mortification of the passions is naturally synonymous with the mortification of the flesh and to prevent passions from escaping there should be a method by which they are held in check, a method which does not ban them completely but rather gives them restriction saying 'this far you may go and not any further'. So, what is that space which gives passion free dominance? Bynum explains that:

In [...] theory, especially in the linguistic and/or psychoanalytic turn it has taken in the past decade, the body as "discovered" or "constructed" has been replaced by bodies as "performative" (as becoming what they are by performing what they choose). (4, quotations and parenthesis in original)

Passion grows within the fibres of the body and is emitted through its surface. The proximity between the body and the social construct, into which it is immersed, is virtually untraceable. However, I would like to propose that there is a liminality between the two entities at the point of them facing each other. On the one hand we have the limitless passions bound within the body and on the other, we have the social construct which places pressure on the body and in turn causes friction between itself and the presence of the body. Through this process the passions become inflamed and swell to the extent that they burst beyond the body. Smollett in some way touches on this process and its effect within the context of Ferdinand's understanding of this process; when Ferdinand spots Theresa's indulgence of his vile propositions he sees that "having thus inflamed her love of pleasure and curiosity, he, with great caution, hinted his design upon the lady's fortune, and perceiving her listening with the most greedy attention, and perfectly ripe for the conspiracy" (*Count Fathom* 17).

Furthermore, Smollett shows that Ferdinand goes in search of this friction in his victims for it is a sure sign of an eruption of passion which is soon to follow:

Fathom had previously reconnoitred the ground, and discovered some marks of inflammability in Mademoiselle's constitution: her beauty was not as such to engage her in those gaieties of amusement, which could flatter her vanity, and dissipate her ideas: and she was of an age, when the little loves and young desires take possession of the fancy; he therefore concluded, that she had the more leisure to indulge those inticing images of pleasure that youth never fails to create, particularly in those who, like her, were addicted to study and solitude. (*Count Fathom* 17-18)

Once again the issue of the effects of inflammation is brought into view. For Ferdinand to acquire control over Mademoiselle's passions, he has to dispose of her

addiction to 'study and solitude' and elicit the inflammation of her attraction to the 'enticing images of pleasure'. For such was Ferdinand's aim, to rule out that which failed to inflame her constitution and induce that which does, so as to hyperbolize the already too decadent passion within the human nature of Mademoiselle.

It is at this point that Barbalet's argument about passions having a purpose provides more clarity to my argument. Passions are not so much reserved for the conspiratorial fantasies of the mind, but they rather serve as propagators of conspiratorial fantasies. Passion not only eggs on the insurgent desires like greed, hunger, envy, but it also acts as a reason for the ignition of those desires. It may well be that passion and desire form one unit consisting of two parts; but if one assumes that desire as a precursor of passion then: one *has* a desire but one *burns* with passion. Desire lingers slyly in the bloodstream whilst passion allows the blood to boil; desire knows that it is still an emotion which strives towards deeper expression; whilst passion understands that its role is to perform the act which desire strives towards. With this analogy one may conclude that desire and passion function as relay candidates where passion relieves desire as soon as it has completed its set course and then passion races to the finish line. Passion swims violently through the constitution and bangs on the walls of the inner lining of the body to escape, it is not made to be contained within the body, and hence the finish line is the object upon which it strikes eventually. Foucault seeks to define the logic of this insurgence:

They [psychoanalysts] have challenged the simple machinery that comes to mind when one speaks of repression; the idea of the rebellious energy that must be throttled has appeared to them inadequate for deciphering the manner in which power and desire are joined to one another; they consider them to be linked in a more complex and primary way than through the interplay of a primitive, natural, and living energy welling up from below, and a higher order seeking to stand in its way; thus one should not think that desire is repressed, for the simple reason that the law constitutes both desire and the lack on which it is predicated. (10)

Foucault profoundly argues that desire is a 'living', 'primitive' and 'natural energy'. However, for Foucault, desire is by no means repressed as it is acknowledged by the law; for the power of governance, desire is a threat. As I have argued earlier, it is desire which is the seed of passion and passion breaks loose inevitably. Smollett divulges:

Let me not therefore be condemned that I have chosen my principal character from the purlieus of treachery and fraud, when I declare my purpose is to set him up as a beacon for the benefit of the unexperienced and unwary, who from these personal memoirs, may learn to avoid the manifold snares with which they are continually surrounded in the paths of life; while those who hesitate on the brink of iniquity, may be terrified from plunging into that irredeemable gulph, by surveying the implorable fate of Ferdinand Count Fathom. ("Dedication" 4)

Smollett sets up the vile and vicious against his intention of frightening the reader who would 'hesitate of the brink of iniquity' through the terror of witnessing Ferdinand's 'implorable fate'. This may be the strategy splayed out in the novel according to Smollett, but the pages upon which he explores this strategy are the ones which will inevitably remain in the mind of the reader, virtuous or vicious. Criminal, fraudulent, passionate Ferdinand teases out the desires of the reader by mirroring the innate impulses of their constitution. He arouses the appetite under which passion breeds and Smollett can therefore not tame their arousal through hoping that they fear the consequences of the raging passions, as these are merely a by-product of the passions:

The story of the squalid misadventures that lead up to and in fact bring about the crisis is itself a case study in the physiological roots of Ferdinand's vicious conduct. His ruling passion is "that venereal appetite which glowed in ... [his] constitution", and it is this that finally destroys him (McAllister 325, quotations and parenthesis in original)

We notice that McAllister comments on the by-product of Ferdinand's passion and that the chief passion is that which has been grafted into the constitution of Ferdinand. His misadventures then reflect the way in which his passions handle

him: violently, mercilessly and viciously:

The sum total of her [Monimia's] charms excited the appetite of Fathom to *such* a degree, that he gazed upon her with such violence of desire, as had never transported him before, and [he] instantly began to harbour thoughts not only destructive to the peace of his generous patron, but also to the prudential maxims he had adopted on his first entrance into life. (*Count Fathom* 201, my emphasis)

His passion transgresses his acquired 'prudential maxims' to the point of destruction not only of himself but of those surrounding him. It encapsulates his body with such intensity of force that there exists no vacancy for reason to dictate to it. This can only mean that when passion is welcomed, however temporarily or superficially, it attacks the body from the inside and poses the same attack on those subjected to it through their association with its host. The clear distinction between Mademoiselle, who is addicted to study and solitude, and Ferdinand who toys with seduction, is seen through the rapid pace at which his passion overtakes him. Mademoiselle needs to be vehemently allured into 'inticing images' and then the process needs to be furthered with Ferdinand's seduction, whereas for Ferdinand himself, the fertility of his desire has already been cultivated and so passion makes a smooth transition through his veins and manifests as the powerful entity lurking in his constitution.

So what does passion imply for its host? Taken from the images expressed in Ferdinand's story, we may conclude that passion is an entity which possesses characteristic traits, likened only to that of power itself. Thus, passion possesses a self-sufficient character: it inflames, it pulsates, it arouses. In other words, it has a certain skill which arrests its object. However, it does need a host through which to function. It is in the habitat of the body, that it is nourished and nurtured to the point of its unleashing. Yet, ever so often it returns to the same host, torturing it with remnants of its preceding effects.

...

3.2 THE MIRROR OF MORALS

John Beasley describes Smollett as "weakly resorting to the same mannerisms [conventional moralistic posturing] in the contrivances of his own resolution [i.e. Ferdinand's conversion] (166). Ferdinand uses his lack of self-governance to dominate Theresa; John Preston foregrounds this notion of anti-Benevolism to describe Ferdinand's attempts to manipulate Theresa into his conspiracy under the guise of moral rectitude. There is then something to be said about anti-Benevolism: it is not explicit in its motivation which is evidently malevolent, but rather it poses itself as a different kind of benevolism for Smollett writes:

The scruples of Theresa being thus removed, she admitted Ferdinand all the privileges of a husband, which enjoyed in stolen interviews; and readily undertook to exert her whole power in promoting his suit with her young mistress, because she now considered his interest as inseparably connected with her own. Surely nothing could be more absurd and preposterous, than the articles of his covenant, which she insisted upon with such inflexibility. How could she suppose, that her pretended lover would be restrained by an oath, when the very occasion of incurring it, was an intention to act in violation of all laws human and divine; and yet such ridiculous conjuration is commonly the cement of every conspiracy, how dark, how treacherous, how impious soever it may be. A certain sign that there are some remains of religion left in the human mind, even after every moral sentiment hath abandoned it; and that the most execrable ruffian finds means to quiet the suggestions of his conscience, by some reversionary hope of heaven's forgiveness. (*Count Fathom* 18)

A dismantling of us and other in ourselves leaves the unified self disjuncted. We are thus made fully aware how Theresa's separates her moral faculties from the idea of herself, refurbished under the influence of Ferdinand. Ferdinand is intrigued with the ease of his endeavour to "inspire her with the love of guilty pleasure" and "debauch her sentiments"; for he need only to insinuate deviation from her sentiments, and she is apt to follow his lead through the cultivation of 'the looser passions'. Ferdinand's aim here is clear in that if he is successful in his

attempt to defile the mind of Theresa, he would only need to succeed at it once and every other insinuation would then, work in accordance with his strategy:

All principles of morality had already been excluded from their [...] plan; consequently, he found it an easy task to interest Theresa in any other scheme tending to their mutual advantage, howsoever wicked and perfidious it may be. (*Count Fathom* 21)

Hence, his success is defined by the sustainability of his scheming. Theresa is inept at discerning the motives of Ferdinand as she perceives only benefits in Ferdinand's propositions. Her actions synchronize with his intentions and he achieves his desired response from her: willingness i.e. a succumbing body. In the third part of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Adam Smith comments on this right conduct in the most profound ways:

We suppose ourselves the spectators of our own behaviour, and endeavour to imagine what effect it would, in this light, produce upon us. This is the only looking-glass by which we can, in some measure, with the eyes of other people, scrutinize the propriety of our own conduct. If in this view it pleases us, we are tolerably satisfied [...]; if we are often, upon that very account, more anxious to gain their approbation, and [...] we are altogether distracted at the thoughts of their censure, which then strikes us with *double severity*. (112, my emphasis)

Smith conducts a stringent argument here; he understands that we chart our own moral progress through and with the idea that we *become* those who look upon us. We are those removed eyes of our spectators who are created by the reflection of that 'looking glass' which casts back the shadow of alternativity, the shadow of their surveillance. Bound between our own conduct and the imagined shadow, the judgemental shadow, we make assumptions on our spectator's behalf and evaluate the decorum of our conduct.

Charles Sherrington, writes concerning the mind being infinite and operating beyond the material brain. He notably argues that the animalism inherent in all living things, including humans, should not be ignored simply on the basis of

humans carrying a superior cognitive capacity. In fact he clarifies the deceptive idea that 'man's mind is precious to him is a disorder of 'anthropism'. His treatment of the human mind implies that the superior nature of the mind is something which simply cannot be attained and our understanding of that tug between passion and reason will slacken, and become a bit more comprehensible, Sherrington's preface is a modest affirmation of the fragility of what is known to us as will, power and the power of will:

The book stresses the view that man is product, like so much else, of the play of natural forces acting on the [...] past and present [...] If the book succeeds in drawing sympathetic attention to this than in those who read it, its pages will have handsomely rewarded one of the best hopes of its author. ("Preface to Second Edition" 19)

Counter-intuitively we base our inspections on the platform of 'how we see ourselves being seen by others; furthermore we disfigure ourselves to the point of misrecognition, so as to position ourselves as our own spectators as Smith holds. What purpose does this bizarre disjunction hold for us? Wilhemina's disposition of reverent desire resolves this question for us and maybe even for Theresa's disjointedness:

She reflected upon the trespasses already committed in her heart, and in the conjectures of her fear, believed that her lover was no other than the devil himself, who had assumed the appearance of Ferdinand, in order to tempt and seduce her virtue. (*Count Fathom* 33)

The disguise in the form of Ferdinand is perplexing and shows what some would call a hysterical assumption of supernatural manifestations of seduction. Wilhemina sees Ferdinand as a type of incubus simply on the basis of his sense of intrigue. Because of her raging desire to be with her lover, the phantasmic interpretation of her seducer falls prey to her understanding of what it means to be attracted to the darker side of the moralistic compass. However, for me, any interpretation of *an-other* self, is in fact the projection of a counterintuitive extension of ourselves i.e. the more powerful our ideas on what we should and should not be doing, the greater the reverence we carry for the other part of

ourselves. Thus we stringently uphold its laws.

This leads to my point that being looked at from another self (an “other” self), [for Theresa it was Ferdinand; for Wilhemina it was her moral compass of virtue] leads those who feel engulfed in the other’s perspective, into perpetual vice.

In Ferdinand’s case penitence is the result of the misfortunes which induce his rehabilitation and ultimately his conversion. Thus the will is the code formulated through the recognition of an authoritative other placing the subject under surveillance and thus the subject is placed under the authorial gaze even when the authorial figure is absent; internalizing the punishment and the authorial gaze so self-surveillance is still exercised. In this way, conditions for practising spectatorship are formed. For Ferdinand this punishment comes in the form of illness:

Redemptive illness is the logical outcome of the physiology of morality and conduct that underlies Ferdinand’s adventures. *This* redemptive illness is also an ironic reversal of the distinctive content of those adventures [...]. More important, Ferdinand’s distinctive criminal talent has been his extraordinary capacity into the temperaments of others, especially of women [...], he exploits the physiology of conduct himself (McAllister 328, emphasis in original).

It is solely under the gaze of self-surveillance that Ferdinand’s misconduct is underscored and it is solely because of this superimposition that his misconduct is amplified. Ferdinand has thus gained seductive capital from toying with his darker passions. With his seductive capital Ferdinand preys upon virginal women and it is because of the allure of his dark sexuality that Ferdinand is frequently successful:

As seducer Ferdinand diagnoses the condition of his victim’s constitution and in a travesty of therapy gains control of her desires through his knowledge of the relation between physiology and the passions. As L.J. Rather says, for eighteenth-century medicine “the emotions are stirred up by the driving power of the mind,” which in turn depends on the powers of the body. (McAllister 329, quotations in original)

For Ferdinand, the use of this authority is channeled for his greater interest in gratifying his vice:

[S]ince women had "a more fine and delicate habit of body," which they tended to weaken further with sedentary habits, they were extremely susceptible. In fact, Sydenham declared that "as to females, if we accept those who lead a hard and hardy life, there is rarely one who is wholly free" from hysteria. Virgins were especially susceptible, since their sexual passions were repressed [...] Girls always grow hysterical "if they continue too long unwedded [...]" The principle was that of the body's effect on the mind: "All animals grow savage in heat, and unless they are suffered to enjoy one another, become changed in disposition. In like manner, women occasionally become insane through ungratified desire (*Count Fathom* 330).

Knowing that repression breeds urgency in the virgin, Ferdinand, applied pressure to their urgency by fooling them into thinking they were going insane, and then having them seek comfort in his arms and consequentially in his bed as in the case of Celinda. Repression has a distinctive role to play when it comes to spectatorship. In this context, repression is dependent on control and internalizing dependency on the authorial gaze. Internalization makes repression steadfast just as it makes right conduct steadfast by optimizing self-surveillance. Repression is the anxiety of 'shamefastnesse' being exploited in the event that transgression occurs. Smollet announces that:

The impulses of fear, which is the most violent and interesting of all the passions, remain longer than any other upon the memory; and for one is allured to virtue, by the contemplation of that peace and happiness which it bestows an hundred are deterred from the practice of virtue, by that infamy and punishment to which it is liable, from the laws and regulations of mankind. ("Dedication" 4)

Fear-induced obedience to virtue is what drives the virgins to stay in place. However, when given the opportunity, knowing that virtue is an ever-present entity however abstract (think of the teacher-pupil analogy), they are inherently

engineered to follow where their passions lead them. Even more so since their desires have been repressed and ungratified. Spectatorship in the wake of the eighteenth-century is imbued with:

The seventeenth-century writers [being] concerned with the passions as a source of, self-knowledge, self-control, and power over others, themes current [yet] still predicated on assumptions no longer familiar (Barbalet 174)

So governance is a major part of the functionality of spectatorship and thus it ordains control both of the self and of the other. The complex part of this correspondence is that the other (the locus of authority) can be imagined as much as it can be physical. It is through this correspondence that the object is being gazed upon whilst the subject may or may not be present. The Foucauldian panoptical model explains how surveillance is the threshold upon which the internalized gaze is formed:

Shock [is] effective in disorders of the imagination and passions, but its value lay in its capacity to change the bodily system: shock caused a revulsion *of the system*; that is of the body, sufficiently severe to alter the patients' minds (McAllister 326, emphasis in original)

Shock induces "a revulsion of the system", a fighting back and a method of weaponry bound up in the passions. McAllister is commenting on the medicinal purposes of shock treatment in eighteenth-century medicine; yet I feel it can also apply to the state under which the body suffers when held intact by the internalized gaze of the spectator so as to remain morally compliant. But what are the dangers involved in this state of internalized spectatorship:

Coleridge said of a machine that it is a man who can do but one thing. A man, says Charles Richet, is a machine which can do a number of things. That is true if we take things he does apart from the mind. But he is a machine with a mind. Does that make a difference? Yes, it enables him to do, in addition, things on a different plane of cognition and intent from those other ones; it enables him to do 'main' things. (Sir Sherrington 158)

It is in exactly this mechanistic mode of man that moralistic laws function. Free will is based on transgression and it is through the adherence to these laws that man becomes the 'machine that is man' and not 'man who is the machine with a mind'. Some stagnation in autonomy is required when upholding the moral code of decorum. In some ways Sir Sherrington's statement implies that the passions then lay in the mind. If desires of autonomy are restricted from the body through the imposition of a moral code, then that very same body is liberated through the use of common sense which binds all things in common. Thus we share the commonality of desire-induced passions which guide the body to the peaks of freedom and are congruent with that of the animal. Hence, animalistic reasoning is unlike human reasoning; yet that specific distinguishing feature does not nullify it of its reasoning features.

If superior humanity is thought of as a destination unique in its ability to function not as a sensual object; where man is 'a machine which has a mind', then the human driven by passion shares his energy with that of the beast whose emotions rules his character. The laws of mankind are designed in such a way that they posit themselves as useful methods by which humans should abide in order to produce character, however that character is said to be out of alignment when according to the law, it carries vices within its structure. Now, as the human pushes towards that superior state, he has to drive out the vices through a moralistic conditioning which opposes the lack of self-control, emotion-control and sex-control. It is here that the eighteenth-century thought presupposes modern psychoanalysis. As in the case of the Freudian libido, civilization is set up to neutralize and subdue the drives of sex and aggression:

One method in particular is crucial: 'with one naile drive out another'. Spinoza said it slightly differently some years later: "An emotion can neither be hindered nor removed save by a contrary emotion". (Barbalet 180, quotations in original)

In such a way, the neutralization comes through treating freedom with the laws of governance. The stoic emotions of self-control superimposed upon the workings of the passions brings about a seemingly balanced civilization. The internalized gaze of the spectator is used to numb the pangs of passion.

...

CONCLUSION

The eighteenth century's preoccupation with articulating through science, philosophy and literature, that man's ability to reason places him in a position of self-governance, has been the driving force beneath my discussion. By understanding that the Enlightenment period became a conglomerate of divergent ideas, trying to refine itself, provoked my interest in establishing some of those emergent ideas. This tension gave rise to the dominant ideology of materialism. Denis Diderot, Jean-Jacques Casanova and Tobias E. Smollett wrote about their eighteenth century context in a way that maintains the body as an entity inseparable from the mind.

I explored the presence of the body in these three writers' fictionalizations of the Enlightenment period and found that because fiction gave a larger scope to the imagination, the inconsistencies of eighteenth century ideology was made manifest. It was easier to draw out the instances in which Enlightenment ideology was at odds with itself through the genre of the novel.

Casanova was my chief writer around which I placed the other two. Casanova writes his autobiographical *Memoirs*, in a way that establishes the body as a medium through which one practices pleasure. He describes promiscuity as a side effect of an impassioned sexual appetite. The idea of moral rectitude is of little importance to Casanova; thus I concluded that for Casanova, the body is a habitat for housing one's innate primal drives and exercising them should not be measured as base or licentious. The body is merely a vehicle for self-expression.

Smollett serves to pose a mirror for the reader, reflecting the outcome of a life led by the senses. His retribution of Ferdinand, highlights the moral rectitude for which Casanova has no concern. Smollett shows that the body needs to be subdued in order to gain a sense of contentment which involves being reformed from a life of lasciviousness.

Diderot, however, posits the body as a thinking entity: A site of reason and intelligence which overturns the notion that the body functions at the will of the mind. He completely dismantles the thinking behind the body being the habitat of the soul.

These novels surface some of the ways in which in the 18th century this relationship (mind, body and soul) is formulated and reformulated in interesting ways.

I perceive that there would be a gap for future research to contribute in that eighteenth century fiction hinted at 21st century psychoanalytic theory which redefined some of the major themes in modern psychology. Acknowledging this limitation, I do take pride in that I have drawn out some important distinctions between the body as a vehicle for hosting a set of erratic sensual appetites and the body as an entity, eloquent in its own language.

At base, I set out to show that the body has a mind of its own as my dissertation title indicates. The body is not a vacuous entity, being filled with intellect, desires and drives. Rather, what I argued was that the body has the primal ability to speak in a way that expresses its innate intelligence. This intelligence is not inferior to the cognitive faculty, however, the mind and body are parts of a unified whole which makes up the reasoning human.

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